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“When We Know Better, We Do Better.”
Embedding the Human Rights of Players as a
Prerequisite to the Legitimacy of Lex Sportiva
and Sport’s Justice System
BRENDAN SCHWAB1†

INTRODUCTION
Players are people first, and athletes second. Former American
National Football League (“NFL”) linebacker Scott Fujita, who was
also a member of the management committee of the National Football
League Players Association (“NFLPA”) during his career, wrote in
2013 of a conversation he was having with his three young daughters
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on the United States of America’s historic struggle for progress. His
words were prompted by the United States Supreme Court considering
legal questions associated with same sex marriage:
At some point, they will hear the term “separate but
equal,” and will learn there was a time when their father
would not have been able to go to the same school or
sit in the same restaurant with many of the same friends
that he now shares an N.F.L. locker room with. But then
I can say to them, “That was a long time ago, and look
how far we’ve come.”
I anticipate us having similar conversations about
women’s suffrage or Rosa Parks. And each time, I’ll be
able to say that this country moved toward progress.
Sometimes, change is slow, but when we know better,
we do better.
Sometimes, people ask me what any of this has to do
with football. Some think football players like me
should just keep our mouths shut and focus on the
game. But we’re people first, and football players a
distant second. Football is a big part of what we do, but
a very small part of who we are. And historically, sports
figures like Jackie Robinson, Billie Jean King and
Muhammad Ali have been powerful agents for social
change. That’s why the messages athletes send —
including the way they treat others and the words they
use — can influence many people, especially
children.”2
The continued revelations of wide-spread and systemic
corruption, cheating, and human rights abuse in world sport illustrate
just how difficult progress can be. When will world sport finally know
better so it can do better?
Players are the public face of world sport.3 Athletic performances
are essential to the prestige, popularity and viability of the Mega
Sporting Events (“MSEs”) that sit at the pinnacle of world sport,
including football’s4 World Cup and the Olympic Games.
2. N.Y. TIMES, Acceptance by Example, on the Field and at Home (Mar. 23,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/24/sports/football/scott-fujita-acceptance-byexample-in-locker-room-and-at-home.html (emphasis added).
3. The words “players” and “athletes” are used interchangeably in this paper.
4. Football, as used in this paper, refers to the sport known as soccer in the United States,
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Accordingly, the players are essential to the success of the sporting and
multi-billion-dollar business undertakings of International Sporting
Organisations (“ISOs”) such as the International Olympic Committee
(“IOC”), the Fédération Internationale de Football Association
(“FIFA”), World Rugby, the International Cricket Council (“ICC”)
and other international sporting federations.5
The work of professional athletes is, by its nature, highly skilled
and valuable, yet risky and precarious. As a condition of that work,
athletes are made subject to regulations by ISOs that are extraordinary
and far-reaching in their complexity and subject matter.6 Increasingly,
those regulations are not justiciable in accordance with national law.7
The athlete, therefore, is at the centre of the intersection between sport
and human rights.
Respect for the fundamental rights of the individual is essential to
progress, the lifting of standards, and is an indispensable element of
any effective governance system. In adopting the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the peoples of the United
Nations “reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the
dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men
and women and have determined to promote social progress and better
standards of life in larger freedom.”8 The corporate responsibility to
respect human rights is, according to the United Nations Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights (“UNGPs”), “a global
standard of expected conduct for all business enterprises wherever they
operate” and one which “exists independently of States’ abilities and /
or willingness to fulfil their own human rights obligations, and does
unless noted.
5. See generally, Rütter+Partner, THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL
SPORTS
ORGANISATIONS
IN
SWITZERLAND
(2013),
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/footballgovernance/02/22/25/11/internation
al_sports_organisations_report_en_ok_neutral.pdf (last visited April 7, 2017);
FIFA,
FINANCIAL
AND
GOVERNANCE
REPORT
2015 (2016), http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/02/77/08/7
1/gb15_fifa_web_en_neutral.pdf (last visited April 7, 2017); see also International Olympic
Committee,
IOC
ANNUAL
REPORT
2015
(2015),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Documents/IOCAnnual-Report/IOC-Annual%20Report-2015.pdf#_ga=1.203402001.1222881834
(last
visited April 7, 2017).
6. Action for Good Governance in International Sports Organisations, Good
governance
in
International
Non-Governmental
Sports
Organisations
at
203, http://www.playthegame.org/fileadmin/documents/Good_governance_reports/AGGISreport_-_16Good_governance_in_INGSOs__p_190-217_.pdf.
7. Id.
8. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS at
1, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf
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not diminish those obligations.”9 Further, “it exists over and above
compliance with national laws and regulations protecting human
rights.”10
This paper examines the governance and conduct of ISOs and
their impact on players by reference to internationally recognised
human rights. It does so by firstly reviewing the applicable
international human rights instruments and standards, including those
promulgated within sport.11
Secondly, this paper considers the governance of ISOs and how
they, as cartels, couple the notions of the specificity and autonomy of
sport with mandatory arbitration clauses to achieve a dominant
position in their dealings with athletes.12 This dominance is particularly
pronounced at the global level notwithstanding an historic legal battle
having been waged by players throughout the world for the recognition
of their rights to work and contract in their chosen field with liberty
and freedom. The notions of the autonomy and specificity of sport,
which are becoming increasingly discredited, run counter to the
development of a governance framework that has the requisite cultural,
institutional and legal commitment to the fundamental human rights of
the players.
Thirdly, this paper explains the enormous rise in the unionisation
of professional athletes during a time of declining unionisation across
industry.13 In so doing, it provides an overview of the circumstances
and human rights risks confronting players which are encouraging
them to organise.
Finally, this paper identifies the essential steps that ISOs must
take to embed the fundamental rights of players and how those steps
can fit comfortably within the vast global capacity of ISOs to regulate,
through political influence and contract, the conduct of everyone
involved in their sport at the international, regional, and national
levels.14 Indeed, that legal and political authority can not only be a
force for good but set a global benchmark for the respect and fulfilment

9. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN
RIGHTS
at
13
(2011),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf.
10. Id.
11. See infra Part I.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part IV.
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of human rights by business.
I.

APPLICABLE INSTRUMENTS AND STANDARDS
A.

INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS – SPORT AND
HUMAN RIGHTS

Article 1 of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization’s (“UNESCO”) International Charter of
Physical Education, Physical Activity and Sport (“UNESCO
Charter”)15 provides that the practice of physical education, physical
activity and sport is a fundamental right for all.16 The UNESCO
Charter sets out a number of universal defining principles which each
ISO should ensure are upheld both by itself as an international
governing body in sport and the various sporting bodies and
stakeholders that operate under each ISO’s auspices.17 Those defining
principles include:
•

Access to sport without discriminating on the basis
of ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property or any other basis.18

•

The freedom to develop through sport must be
supported by all governmental, sporting and
educational institutions.19

•

Sport must be inclusive and promote equal
opportunities for all.20

•

Every human being must have the opportunity to
attain a level of achievement through sport.21

•

All stakeholders must participate in creating a
strategic vision for sport, including sport

15. International Charter of Physical Education, Physical Activity and Sport, UNITED
NATIONS
EDUCATIONAL,
SCIENTIFIC
AND
CULTURAL
ORGANIZATION, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002354/235409e.pdf (last visited
April 7, 2017).
16. Id. at 2.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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professionals.22
•

All stakeholders must ensure their activities are
economically, socially and environmentally
sustainable.23 In particular, the organisers of sports
events “must pay due consideration to the
overarching principle of sustainability, be it
economic, social, environmental or sporting,”24
especially in relation to the legacy of major sports
events.25

•

Policy decisions must be based on sound factual
evidence.26

•

Good governance must be implemented.27

The link between good governance as emphasized in the
UNESCO Charter and the protection of human rights is important and
one that will be explored in this paper in relation to the position of the
players. In his April 2016 report to FIFA For the Game. For the World.
FIFA and Human Rights, Professor John G. Ruggie wrote:
Bribery and corruption is not only about giving and
taking money for private gain that has been intended for
broader social purposes. It may also enable the parties
involved to evade legal and contractual requirements,
including those protecting human rights. Lack of
financial integrity, therefore, is a foundational source of
human rights risks.28
Article 10.5 of the UNESCO Charter imposes clear obligations
on employers of the players in sport:
Any employer in the field of physical education,
physical activity or sport or related areas must pay due
consideration to the psychological and physical health
of their employees, including professional athletes.
International labour conventions and basic human
22. Id. at 4.
23. Id. at 5.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 7.
28. John G. Ruggie, For the Game. For the World., HARVARD UNIVERSITY at 21 (2016),
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/mrcbg/programs/cri/research/reports/report68.
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rights must be respected, in particular to avoid child
labour and human trafficking.29
Principle 12 of the UNGPs and its commentary provides that an
“authoritative list of the core internationally recognised human rights
is contained in the International Bill of Human Rights.”30 The critical
instruments include the: Universal Declaration of Human Rights;31
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;32 International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;33 and the eight
core conventions of the International Labour Organization (“ILO”) as
set out in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights
at Work and its Follow-Up.34
Without limitation, the relevant instruments entitle everyone,
including professional athletes, to the: right of freedom of association,
to form trade unions and to collectively bargain; right to work and the
free choice of employment; protection of wages; right to equal pay for
equal work; elimination of forced labour, including through subtle
means such as the accumulation of debt or the retention of identity
papers; right, if a child, to special care and assistance; and right to be
protected against discrimination.35 The UNGPs also provide that,
“[d]epending on circumstances, business enterprises may need to
consider additional standards.”36
Principle 24 of the UNGPs requires enterprises to prioritise their
efforts to deal with actual or potential human rights risks “that would
be most severe, recognizing that a delayed response may affect
remediability.”37 A complete analysis of the actual and potential human
rights impacts of the conduct and activities of ISOs on players is
29. International Charter of Physical Education, Physical Activity and Sport, supra, note
15 at 8 (emphasis added).
30. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 9, at 14.
31. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra, note 8.
32. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN
RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx (last visited April
7, 2017).
33. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNITED NATIONS
HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx
34. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its FollowUp, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—ed_norm/—-declaration/documents/publication/wcms_467653.pdf (last visited April 7,
2017).
35. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra, note 8; International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, supra, note 32 at 5-6, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work and its Follow-up, supra, note 34, at 2.
36. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 9, at 14.
37. Id. at 26.

4_FINAL_SCHWAB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

11/14/17 7:54 PM

WHEN WE KNOW BETTER, WE DO BETTER

11

beyond the scope of this paper. This paper focuses on three key rights
of players: (1) the right to organise and collectively bargain; (2) the
right to work and to the free choice of employment; and (3) the
protection of wages. These are, in many ways, the foundational and
most important rights that players need to have respected by ISOs,
employers, and other enterprises involved in the governance of world
sport. A failure by sport to respect these rights can end a player’s
career.
B.

THE REGULATORY COMMITMENT OF ISOs TO
HUMAN RIGHTS

The Olympic Charter, as in force from 2 August 2015, “expressly
connects sport, human rights and peace and builds on the philosophy
that underpinned the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in 1948.”38
Similarly, article 3 of the FIFA Statutes was amended in February
2016 to provide that “FIFA is committed to respecting all
internationally recognised human rights and shall strive to promote the
protection of these rights.”39
In 2016, both the IOC and FIFA took steps to embed respect for
human rights into key aspects of their organisation.40 The IOC held
meetings with the Sports and Rights Alliance, a coalition of nongovernmental organisations and trade unions, and agreed to amend the
IOC Host City Contract for 2024 by making express provision in
relation to human rights.41 Section 13 now provides:
…the Host City, the Host NOC (National Olympic
38. Olympic
Charter,
INTERNATIONAL
OLYMPIC
COMMITTEE
(2015),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf.
39. Fed’n Internationale de Football Ass’n [FIFA], FIFA Statutes, at 63 (Effective April
2016),
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/generic/02/78/29/07/fifastatutsweben_n
eutral.pdf.
40. Id.; Explanatory Notes to Host City Contract 2024 – Principles, INTERNATIONAL
OLYMPIC
COMMITTEE
at
17, https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Documents/HostCity-Elections/XXXIII-Olympiad-2024/Host%20City%20Contract%202024%20%20Principles.pdf#_ga=1.1431858.2090504467.1478856487.
41. Requirements for Human Rights, Labour Rights, Anti-Corruption and Stakeholder
Involvement
for
Olympic
and
Paralympic
Games,
SPORT
&
RIGHTS
ALLIANCE,
http://www.sportandhumanrights.org/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2016/12/SRA-Letter-to-IOC.pdf (last visited April 7, 2017); Olympics: Host
City
Contract
Requires
Human
Rights,
HUMAN
RIGHTS
WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/28/olympics-host-city-contract-requires-humanrights.
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Committee) and the OCOG (Organising Committee for
the Olympic Games) shall, in their activities related to
the organisation of the Games:
a. prohibit any form of discrimination with regard to a
country or a person on grounds of race, colour, sex,
sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status;
b. protect and respect human rights and ensure any
violation of human rights is remedied in a manner
consistent with international agreements, laws and
regulations applicable in the Host Country and in a
manner consistent with all internationally-recognised
human rights standards and principles, including the
United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights, applicable in the Host Country; and
c. refrain from any act involving fraud or corruption, in
a manner consistent with any international agreements,
laws and regulations applicable in the Host Country and
all internationally-recognised anti-corruption standards
applicable in the Host Country, including by
establishing and maintaining effective reporting and
compliance.”42
In October 2016, FIFA adopted a new strategy, FIFA 2.0: The
Vision for the Future which states that FIFA must “champion human
rights” to build FIFA into a stronger institution.43 This requires the
organisation to “align” its activities with the UNGPs,44 and to “use its
influence to address these human rights risks as determinedly as it does
to pursue its commercial interests.”45
The Olympic Charter includes seven “fundamental principles of
Olympism.”46 The fourth principle states that: “The practice of sport is
a human right. Every individual must have the possibility of practising
42. Explanatory Notes to Host City Contract 2024 – Principles, supra, note 40 (emphasis
added).
43. FIFA 2.0: The Vision for the Future, FIFA at 30 (Oct. 13, 2016),
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/generic/02/84/35/01/fifa_2.0_vision_lo
w_neu.17102016_neutral.pdf.
44. Id. at 42.
45. Id. at 63.
46. Olympic Charter, supra, note 38.
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sport, without discrimination of any kind and in the Olympic spirit,
which requires mutual understanding with a spirit of friendship,
solidarity and fair play.”47
The general principles of human rights enunciated in the Olympic
Charter and the FIFA Statutes, however, have yet to be entrenched as
express legal rights of athletes working within their purview. A further
process of regulatory promulgation is needed. Such a process was
recently contemplated but not completed by the IOC when it, through
the adoption of Olympic Agenda 2020, moved to address the concerns
of LGBTI athletes in response to crowd behaviour at the 2014 Sochi,
Russia Winter Olympic Games.48 Specifically, Recommendation 14 of
Olympic Agenda 2020 is to “strengthen the 6th Fundamental Principle
of Olympism.”49 The sixth principle now reads:
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in
this Olympic Charter shall be secured without
discrimination of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status.50
In June 2017, FIFA released FIFA’s Human Rights Policy May
2017 edition.51 The development of the policy accorded with the first
recommendation of Professor Ruggie in his report to FIFA to “Adopt
a Clear and Coherent Human Rights Policy” which he described as
“the first step for any organization on the path to respecting human
rights.”52 The policy, which was adopted by the FIFA Council in May
2017,53 provides that: “FIFA is committed to respecting human rights
47. Id. at 13.
48. See generally Olympic Agenda 2020, THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC
COMMITTEE (2017), https://www.olympic.org/olympic-agenda-2020; see also Olympic
Agenda
2020,
INTERNATIONAL
OLYMPIC
COMMITTEE
(Dec.
2014),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Documents/Olympic
-Agenda-2020/Olympic-Agenda-2020-20-20Recommendations.pdf#_ga=1.234177310.1222881834.1489166123.
49. Id.
50. Olympic Charter, supra, note 38.
51. Fed’n Internationale de Football Ass’n [FIFA], FIFA’s Human Rights Policy May
2017
Edition
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/footballgovernance/02/89/33/12/fifashu
manrightspolicy_neutral.pdf
52. For the Game. For the World., supra, note 28 at 29.
53. Fed’n Internationale de Football Ass’n [FIFA], FIFA Activity Update on Human
Rights
May
2017,
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/footballgovernance/02/89/33/21/activity
update_humanrights_may2017_neutral.pdf at 2.
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in accordance with the UNGPs.”54
FIFA’s commitment embraces all internationally recognised
human rights, including those contained in the International Bill of
Human Rights (consisting of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)
and the ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work and its Follow-Up.55
FIFA’s “salient human rights risks” include “[p]layers’ rights”.
Accordingly, FIFA “is committed to helping protect the rights of
football players and will continually evaluate existing regulations and
processes and, if necessary, consider additional measures to address
respective risks.”56 Further:
FIFA embeds its commitment throughout the
organisation and engages in an ongoing due diligence
process to identify, address, evaluate and communicate
the risks of involvement with adverse human rights
impacts. FIFA is committed to providing for or
cooperating in remediation where it has caused or
contributed to adverse human rights impacts.57
Where national laws and regulations and international
standards differ or are in conflict with each other, FIFA
will follow the higher standard without infringing upon
domestic laws and regulations.58
Significantly, paragraph 13 of the policy reads: “Human rights
commitments are binding on all FIFA bodies and officials when
exercising their respective powers and competencies, including when
interpreting and enforcing FIFA rules.”59
Accordingly, FIFA’s Human Rights Policy May 2017 edition
makes it clear that not only is FIFA committing to respecting
internationally recognised human rights, it is committed to recognising
54. Fed’n Internationale de Football Ass’n [FIFA], FIFA’s Human Rights Policy May
2017
Edition
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/footballgovernance/02/89/33/12/fifashu
manrightspolicy_neutral.pdf, Paragraph 1 at 5.
55. Id. paragraph 2 at 5.
56. Id. paragraph 5 at 6-7.
57. Id. paragraph 6 at 7.
58. Id. paragraph 7 at 7.
59. Id. paragraph 13 at 10.
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those rights of the players in a proactive manner which is binding and
provides for remediation.
II.

SPORTS GOVERNANCE: A MONOLITHIC FRONT
A.

THE SPECIFICITY AND AUTONOMY OF SPORT

Despite the broad commitment to human rights in the Olympic
Charter, there are considerable cultural and institutional barriers to the
full acceptance of the human rights of players by ISOs and the world
of sport. In simple terms, this is due to how sport is governed and the
emphasis placed on the autonomy and specificity of sport. These
notions only serve to exacerbate the anti-competitive governance
structures of ISOs.
The fifth and seventh fundamental principles of Olympism
provide:
5. Recognising that sport occurs within the framework
of society, sports organisations within the Olympic
Movement shall have the rights and obligations of
autonomy, which include freely establishing and
controlling the rules of sport, determining the structure
and governance of their organisations, enjoying the
right of elections free from any outside influence and
the responsibility for ensuring that principles of good
governance be applied…
7. Belonging to the Olympic Movement requires
compliance with the Olympic Charter and recognition
by the IOC.60
According to the Sports Governance Observer 2015, as prepared
by Dr. Arnout Geeraert and published by the October 2015 Play the
Game conference in Aarhaus, Denmark:
Even though they have allowed politics to influence
their policies and decisions, autonomy from formal
regulatory public interference is an obsession for
[International Sporting Federations, or] ISFs. Modern
sport’s construction is, in essence, rooted in classic
liberalism, namely in the concept of freedom of
association. Autonomy is therefore a deeply ingrained
60. Olympic Charter, supra, note 38 at 13-14.
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and cherished principle in the sports world. It is an
essential part of ISFs’ belief system; a doctrine that they
aim to spread among political institutions and
stakeholders in order to keep the governance of
international sport strictly private.”61
Unconditional, or poorly defined, autonomy presents a threat to
the good governance of sport. The prevalence of corruption within
ISOs promoted Play the Game to label 2015 the “year that killed the
autonomy of sport.”62 In his report of 2 December 2015, Dr. François
Carrard, the independent chair of the 2016 FIFA Reform Committee,
wrote:
FIFA is currently going through the worst crisis of its
history. The current crisis should also be considered as
a unique opportunity for FIFA to renew itself. Thus, in
order to restore confidence in FIFA, significant
modifications to its institutional structure and
operational processes are necessary to prevent
corruption, fraud, self-dealing and to make the
organisation more transparent and accountable.63
The previous month, the report of the World Anti-Doping Agency
(“WADA”) independent commission into Russian athletics chaired by
Mr. Dick Pound found that “[a]ctual and potential conflicts of interest
at the WADA Executive Committee and Foundation Board make
decisive actions regarding Code compliance unnecessarily difficult to
achieve.”64 The report also found a deeply rooted culture of cheating at
the highest level of Russian athletics involving the governing body and
anti-doping agency, the exploitation of athletes and bribery and
corruption within the International Association of Athletics
Federations (“IAAF”).65

61. Arnout Geeraert, Sports Governance Observer 2015, PLAY THE GAME at 13 (Oct.
2015), http://www.playthegame.org/media/5786679/sgo_report_final_3.pdf.
62. Jens Sejer Andersen, The Year that Killed the Autonomy of Sport, PLAY THE GAME at
1 (Dec. 23, 2015), http://www.playthegame.org/news/comments/2015/021_the-year-thatkilled-the-autonomy-of-sport/.
63. 2016 FIFA Reform Committee Report, FIFA at 1 (December 2, 2015),
https://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/footballgovernance/02/74/17/54/2015.
11.27finalreport_forpublication_neutral.pdf.
64. The Independent Commission Report #1: Final Report, INDEPENDENT COMMISSION
INVESTIGATION
at
276
(Nov.
9.
2015),
https://www.wadaama.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/wada_independent_commission_report_1_en.pdf.
65. The Independent Commission Report #1: Final Report (Nov. 9, 2015)
https://www.wada-
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Recognition of the “specific nature of sport,” as a notion within
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), is, of
course, conditional.66 It demands good governance, social dialogue and
the protection and development of young people, especially through
education.67 Further, it does not affect sport where it is an economic
activity.68 Reforms are required for these conditions to be upheld. As
sports are structured as cartels, they warrant not special treatment and
protection, but enhanced scrutiny and accountability.
A 2010 paper of the European Parliament on the TFEU and
European Union (“EU”) sports policy encourages social dialogue as a
vehicle for the sports movement to take the lead in resolving tensions
over the meaning of the specificity of sport, stating:
Rather than passively relying on the reference to the
“specific nature of sport” contained in Article 165 to
seek to repel the influence of EU law in sport, the sports
movement should take a lead in defining this contested
term. This definition should be built into the relevant
sports regulations following an open and transparent
method of operation facilitated by the governing bodies
but involving affected stakeholders. The definition
should be thoroughly reasoned and backed with robust
data.69
However, the development of social dialogue within sport has
proven to be particularly challenging. The paper also notes:
In this respect, the reference in Article 165(2) to the
promotion of cooperation between bodies responsible
for sports adds impetus to the (European)
Commission’s agenda. In particular, the Commission
ama.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/wada_independent_commission_report_1_en.pdf.
66. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION at 120 (October, 26, 2012), http://eurlex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_2&format=PDF; Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union & Comments, THE LISBON TREATY, http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbontreaty/treaty-on-the-functioning-of-the-european-union-and-comments.html.
67. See generally id.
68. See generally id; Case C-519/04P David Meca Medina and Igor Majcen v.
Commission (2006) ECR I-6991 and Case T-313/02 Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission
(2004) ECR II-3291.
69. Dr. Richard Parrish, et al., The Lisbon Treaty and EU Sports Policy:
Study,
EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT
at
8,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/cult/dv/esstudyeusportspoli
cy/esstudyeusportspolicyen.pdf (emphasis added).
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has long promoted dialogue with the sports movement
and has been at the forefront of encouraging social
dialogue. Article 165 also adds impetus to efforts to
move dialogue between the EU and the sports
movement onto a more structured footing. However,
given the diversity of the sports movement, structuring
dialogue on a meaningful and inclusive basis is a
significant challenge for the EU.70
The slow development of social dialogue would not seem to be
solely a structural issue, as advanced and sophisticated collective
bargaining occurs in many parts of the sporting world, including in
various sports in North America, Australia, and New Zealand as well
as within European and world football.71 The issue is leverage, with the
bargaining position of the athletes and their representatives being
undermined by the recognition of sport’s apparently special nature
without the condition that it be implemented with the requisite
knowledge base obtained through social dialogue with the partners
most affected and underpinned by the recognition of and respect for
the rights of the players.
B.

“AN EMPLOYERS’ SYSTEM…”

Underpinning the dominant position of ISOs is the fact that they
are structured as cartels and often enjoy a monopoly position in the
labour market for players. According to Braham Dabscheck,
Australia’s leading academic on the industrial relations aspects of
sport:
The major reason why clubs act, or more correctly have
acted, collectively is due to ‘the peculiar economics of
professional team sports.’ Unlike other areas of
economic life, sporting contests require the cooperation
of competitors to create a product - namely, a game, or
a series of games in a ‘regular’ competition...
In addition to this, however, it has been argued that if a
league is to generate interest, and enhance its income70. Id. at 7-8.
71. See generally, Brendan Schwab, Collective Bargaining in Australian Professional
Team Sports, ASSH Bulletin No. 29 (Dec. 1998); see also Daniel Pannett, Collective
Bargaining in Sport: Challenges and Benefits, 4 UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 189
(2015); see also Ryan T. Dryer, Comment: Beyond the Box Score: A Look at Collective
Bargaining Agreements in Professional Sports and Their Effect on Competition, 2008 J.
Disp. Resol. 267 (2008).
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earning potential, it needs to maximise the uncertainty
of the sporting competition…
The major way in which clubs traditionally colluded
was in the labour market. Various leagues, and their
constituent clubs, developed employment rules which
tied a player to the club he or she originally signed with
and/or placed limits on their income ... Economists
describe this situation, where a player can only
negotiate with a single buyer, as a monopsony.72
In simple terms, sporting organisations are structured so as to
exercise great power in their dealings with athletes. In professional
team sports, a wide range of controls over the movement of players
have been employed from time to time, including: the retain and
transfer system; the reserve clause; player drafts; zoning; permit rules;
training compensation; home grown player rules; and salary caps.73
These rules all place restrictions on the economic and sporting
freedom of the players. Accordingly, they may be in conflict with the
common law doctrine of restraint of trade. In 1894 in Nordenfelt v.
Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition,74 Lord Macnaughten
defined the restraint of trade doctrine as follows:
The public have an interest in every person’s carrying
on his trade freely; so has the individual. All
interference with individual liberty of action in trading,
and all restraints of trade of themselves, if there is
nothing more, are contrary to public policy, and
therefore, void. But there are exceptions. Restraints of
trade and interference with individual liberty of action,
may be justified by the special circumstances of a
particular case. It is a sufficient justification, and
indeed, it is the only justification, if the restriction is
reasonable – reasonable, that is, in reference to the
interests of the parties concerned and reasonable in
reference to the interests of the public, so framed and
so guarded as to afford adequate protection to the party
in whose favour it is imposed, while at the same time it
72. Braham Dabscheck, Industrial Relations in Australasian Professional Team
Sports, 4, 30 Otemon J. of Australian Studies 3 (2004) available
at https://www.otemon.ac.jp/research/labo/cas/publication/pdf/30/2.pdf.
73. Id. at 11.
74. See generally [1894] AC 535.
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is in no way injurious to the public.75
The test under competition law is similar in the major sporting
jurisdictions of the United States and Europe.76 Freedom of movement
and contract are rights, but not absolute ones. Restrictions can be
justified if they are designed to advance a legitimate interest, and go
no further than is reasonably necessary in order to do so.
The first major legal victory for free agency came over fifty years
ago – in 1963 – when England international George Eastham and the
Professional Footballers’ Association (“PFA”) challenged football’s
retain and transfer system as being an unreasonable restraint of trade.77
Eastham wanted to move from Newcastle United to Arsenal, and was
out of contract. He refused to sign a new contract with Newcastle, but
was “retained” by the club.
Eastham learned this officially on 30 June 1960, the last day of
his contract. He was not a playing, contracted, or paid member of
Newcastle United; but he was ineligible to play for anyone else. On 13
October 1960, he, with the backing of the PFA, began legal
proceedings. Some five weeks later, his requested transfer was granted,
for a fee of £47,000 (players could then earn a maximum of £20/week).
By this stage, the whole affair had grown into a test case involving the
basic rights of all professional footballers. Eastham allowed his case to
be pressed to its conclusion.
Mr. Justice Wilberforce declared that the retain and transfer
system was an unreasonable restraint of trade and therefore was not
binding on Eastham. He referred to the administrators as “reasonable
men whose attitude to their players was as much paternal as
proprietary.” He said the retain and transfer system was:
…an employers’ system, set up in an industry where the
employers have succeeded in establishing a monolithic
front all over the world, and where it is clear that for the
purpose of negotiation the employers are vastly more
strongly organized than the employees. No doubt the
employers all over the world consider the system a
75. Id. at 565.
76. Sherman Anti-Trust Act 1890, 5 U.S.C. sections 1-7 and amended by the Clayton
Act in 1914 (15 U.S.C. sections 12-27).
77. Eastham v Newcastle United [1964] Ch. 413. See DAVID MCARDLE, FROM BOOT
MONEY TO BOSMAN, FOOTBALL, SOCIETY, AND THE LAW (2000); Steve Tongue, Heart of the
Union: Why the Modern Game Should Be Grateful to George Eastham, Independent (Jan. 14,
2007) http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/news-and-comment/heart-of-the-unionwhy-the-modern-game-should-be-grateful-to-george-eastham-432060.html
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good system, but this does not prevent the court from
considering whether it goes further than is reasonably
necessary to protect their legitimate interests.78
Although fought as a question of competition law, the historic
words of the athletes at the centre of these struggles resonate strongly
with the language of human rights. For example, St. Louis Cardinals
baseball player, Curt Flood, on 24 December 1969, wrote to Major
League Baseball (“MLB”) Commissioner Bowie Kuhn:
Dear Mr. Kuhn,
After twelve years in the major leagues I do not feel that
I am a piece of property to be bought and sold
irrespective of my wishes. I believe that any system
that produces that result violates my rights as a citizen
and is inconsistent with the laws of the United States
and the several states.
It is my desire to play baseball in 1970 and I am capable
of playing. I have received a contract from the
Philadelphia club, but I believe I have the right to
consider offers from other clubs before making any
decisions. I, therefore, request that you make known to
all the major league clubs my feelings in this matter,
and advise them of my availability for the 1970
season.79
In reply, Mr. Kuhn wrote:
Dear Curt,
. . . You have entered into a current playing contract
with the St. Louis club, which has the same assignment
provision as those in your annual major league
contracts since 1956.
I do not see what action I can take and I cannot comply
with the request contained in…your letter…80
Kuhn’s rejection of Flood, expected as it was, came in the midst
78. Eastham v Newcastle United [1964] Ch. 413, at 438.
79. National
Archives
Catalog,
Letter
to
Bowie
K.
Kuhn, https://research.archives.gov/id/278312 (stating he had the right to consider offers from
other baseball clubs before signing a contract) (DEC. 24, 1969).
80. Id.
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of an era of athletes fighting for the freedom to pursue their careers.
While Flood was to lose his battle for free agency before the United
States Supreme Court due to a combination of stare decisis and
anomalous precedent from the 1920s,81 MLB players would ultimately
win free agency in the 1970s.82 In jurisdictions as spread as the United
States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the European Union, the
fundamental right of players to pursue their profession with liberty and
freedom would be judicially recognised.83
Balmain and Australian rugby league international Dennis Tutty
challenged the New South Wales Rugby League’s equivalent of
football’s retain and transfer system in Buckley v Tutty.84 Like
Eastham, Tutty’s contract with Balmain had expired and he could not
play anywhere else unless Balmain gave him permission to do so.85
The High Court of Australia extended the Eastham decision by
looking beyond the retention aspect of the system and at the impact of
transfer fees, stating that:
In our opinion the rules now under consideration go
beyond what is reasonable in two main respects. In the
first place, they enable a club to prevent any
professional who has played in one of its teams from
playing with another club, notwithstanding that he has
ceased to play for the club which retains him and no
longer receives any remuneration from that club.
…A second objection to the rules in their present form
is in relation to the question of transfer fees. Although
a club does not wish to retain a player, and is prepared
to see him go to another club, it may fix a transfer fee,
81. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 282, 258 (1972); id. at 290.
82. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corporation, Plaintiff, v. Major League Baseball
Players Association, Defendant, Golden West Baseball Company et al., Plaintiff-Intervenors,
409 F.Supp. 233 (1976).
83. See supra notes 77 to 82; see infra notes 84 to 95; see generally Robertson v. National
Basketball Association 389 F.Supp. 867 (1975); Greig and others v. Insole and others: World
Series Cricket Pty. Ltd. v. same. [1977 G. No. 2246] 1977 J. No. 4876]; John Mackey et al.,
v. National Football League et al., 543 F.2d 606; McNeil v. National Football League 790
F.Supp. 871 (1992).
84. [1971] HCA 71 363.
85. Braham Dabscheck, Righting a Wrong: Dennis Tutty and His Struggle Against the
New South Wales Rugby League, 4 Australian & New Zealand Sports L.J. 145, 151-52
(2009), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ANZSportsLawJl/2009/7.pdf;
Braham Dabscheck, Industrial Relations in Australasian Professional Team Sports,
30
Otemon
J.
of
Australian
Studies
3,
4
(2004),
available
at https://www.otemon.ac.jp/research/labo/cas/publication/pdf/30/2.pdf.
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most of which goes to the club itself, although it may
be quite unrelated to any benefit which the player has
received from his membership of or association with
the club…It is no answer to say that the transfer fee may
be fixed by reference to what it would cost the club to
obtain another player equally skillful, for this is only
another way of saying that an employer may restrain an
employee from working elsewhere unless he is
compensated for the loss of his services. In this respect
also the restraint imposed by the rules goes further than
is necessary to protect the reasonable interests of the
League and its members.86
Sport’s employment rules returned to the High Court of Australia
again in the early 1990s because of a labour dispute in the New South
Wales Rugby League.87 Unlike Tutty, the Adamson case was a class
action coordinated by the Association of Rugby League Professionals
and its former player and barrister President, Kevin Ryan. At question,
rugby league’s newly introduced internal draft. At first instance, Mr.
Justice Hill found the restraint to be reasonable.88 The Full Court of the
Federal Court allowed the players’ appeal and dealt with the matter
succinctly; in the words of Mr. Justice Wilcox: “…the right to choose
between prospective employers is a fundamental element of a free
society. It is the existence of this right which separates the free person
from the serf.”89
In 1995 in the European Court of Justice came arguably the most
important sports law decision of all time. The Bosman ruling has
revolutionised football.90 The case, funded by FIFPro,91 challenged
football’s training compensation and transfer system and the
imposition of quotas on foreign players within European professional
leagues.92 The legal case was based on the then Article 39 of the Treaty
86. Buckley v Tutty (1971) 125 CLR 353 at 378
87. See Adamson v. New South Wales Rugby League Limited [1991] FCA 8.
88. Id.
89. Adamson v. New South Wales Rugby League Limited [1991] FCA 425, paragraph 60
per Wilcox J..
90. See Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge Des Societes de Football Ass’n and Others
v. Bosman and Others, 1995 E.C.R. I-4921.
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61993CJ0415.
91. FIFPro World Players’ Union, https://www.fifpro.org/en/about-fifpro/about-fifpro.
(Noting FIFPro is short for the Federation Internationale des Associations de Footballeurs
Professionnels. According to FIFPro’s website, “FIFPro is the worldwide representative
organisation for all professional footballers”).
92. Dr.
Geoff
Pearson,
Fact-Sheet
One:
The
Bosman
Case,
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Establishing the European Community:
1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured
within the Community.
2. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition
of any discrimination based on nationality between
workers of the Member States as regards employment,
remuneration and other conditions of work and
employment.
3. It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified
on grounds of public policy, public security or public
health:
(a) to accept offers of employment actually made;
(b) to move freely within the territory of Member States
for this purpose;
(c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of
employment in accordance with the provisions
governing the employment of nationals of that State
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action;
(d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after
having been employed in that State, subject to
conditions which shall be embodied in implementing
regulations to be drawn up by the Commission.93
Advocate General Lenz, on the quota system, stated in Bosman:
No deep cogitation is required to reach the conclusion
that the rules on foreign players are of a discriminatory
nature. They represent an absolutely classic case of
discrimination on the ground of nationality. Those rules
limit the number of players from other Member States
whom a club in a particular Member State can play in a
match. Those players are thereby placed at a
disadvantage with access to employment, compared
with players who are nationals of that Member State.94
http://fru.merseyside.org/bosman.htm.
93. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra, note 66 and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002 (C 325/01) 51. http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12002E%2FTXT.
94. Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Societies de Football Association and others
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On the compensation system, Lenz stated:
…that presupposes precisely that a player can be
regarded as a sort of merchandise for which a price is
to be paid. Such an attitude may correspond to today’s
reality, as characterized by the transfer rules, in which
the ‘buying’ and ‘selling’ of players is indeed spoken
of. That reality must not blind us to the fact that this is
an attitude which has no legal basis and is not
compatible with the right to freedom of movement ... I
also have considerable doubt as to whether a system
which ultimately amounts to treating players as
merchandise is liable to promote the sporting ethos…95
C. INTERNATIONAL SPORTS ARBITRATION AND ‘LEX
SPORTIVA’
The modern legal and political recognition of the notions of the
specificity and autonomy of sport96 have enabled ISOs to establish a
legally binding institutional framework that upholds rules that the sport
regards as important even where they may be counter to recognised
rights under international and domestic law. This has been made
possible through the use of arbitration clauses in the contracts signed
by athletes as a condition of their participation in sport, coupled with
an institutional condemnation of sporting participants who seek access
to judicial remedies. This has allowed, for example, for the
continuation and growth of a market based player transfer system and
its expansion to third party interests despite the ruling of the European
Court of Justice in Bosman.97
Those participating in sport under the auspices of the IOC or
another ISO are almost always required to ultimately have sports or
labour related disputes determined by the Court of Arbitration for
v. Bosman and others, ECLI:EU:C:1995:293.
95. Id.
96. See Int’l Olympic Comm., Historic Milestone: United Nations Recognises Autonomy
of Sport, (Nov. 3, 2014), https://www.olympic.org/news/historic-milestone-united-nationsrecognises-autonomy-of-sport. See generally, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, supra, note 66.
97. See generally, Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] March 27, 2012,
4A_558/2011,
http://www.swissarbitrationdecisions.com/sites/default/files/27%20mars%202012%204A%2
055. See also Matuzalem Case: CAS Decision Fully Backs FIFA Regulations, FIFA.com
(May 20, 2009) http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/news/y=2009/m=5/news=matuzalem-casecas-decision-fully-backs-fifa-regulations-1060323.html.
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Sport (“CAS”), which is headquartered in Lausanne, Switzerland.98
Chapter 6 of the Olympic Charter deals with “Measures and
Sanctions, Disciplinary Procedures and Dispute Resolution.”99 It
provides for a wide range of measures and sanctions where the
Olympic Charter and regulations promulgated by the IOC and
recognised bodies in advancement of the Charter have been
breached.100 Measures and sanctions may be taken against members of
the Olympic Movement including IOC members, international
sporting federations, national Olympic committees, host cities,
Olympic organising committees, candidate cities, and other recognised
associations and organisations.101 The sanctions include withdrawal
from the Olympic Games (including from a sport, event or a
discipline), suspensions, withdrawal of recognition, and reprimands.102
Further, the right to host the Olympic Games can be withdrawn.103
Rule 61 deals with the resolution of any disputes arising from the
Olympic Charter in clear terms:
1. The decisions of the IOC are final. Any dispute
relating to their application or interpretation may be
resolved solely by the IOC Executive Board and, in
certain cases, by arbitration before the Court of
Arbitration for Sport (CAS).
2. Any dispute arising on the occasion of, or in
connection with, the Olympic Games shall be
submitted exclusively to the Court of Arbitration for
Sport, in accordance with the Code of Sports-Related
Arbitration.104
FIFA similarly recognises CAS, including in relation to disputes
“between FIFA, member associations, confederations, leagues, clubs,
players, officials, intermediaries and licensed match agents.”105 The
98. See generally COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, http://www.tascas.org/en/index.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2017).
99. Int’l
Olympic
Comm.
[IOC],
Olympic
Charter
at
101–105
https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf.
100. See generally Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Int’l Olympic Comm. [IOC], Olympic Charter Rule 59.1.6 at 102 (effective Aug. 2,
2015), https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf.
104. Int’l Olympic Comm. [IOC], Olympic Charter Rule 61 at 105 (effective Aug. 2,
2015), https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf.
105. FIFA Statutes, supra note 39, Article 57.1 at 54.
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FIFA Statutes, as amended in February 2016, provide that “CAS shall
primarily apply the various regulations of FIFA and, additionally,
Swiss law.”106 Article 59 of the FIFA Statutes further provides that:
confederations, member associations, and leagues shall recognise
CAS; recourse to ordinary courts is prohibited unless specifically
provided for in FIFA regulations; and member associations must insert
a clause in their statutes or regulations that it is prohibited for disputes
including between clubs and players to be resolved in the ordinary
courts of law.107
On the issue of arbitration at the regional or national level, article
59.3 of the FIFA Statutes provides that, “[i]nstead of recourse to
ordinary courts of law, provision shall be made for arbitration. Such
disputes shall be taken to an independent and duly constituted
arbitration tribunal under the rules of the association or confederation
or to CAS.”108
Likewise, the 2015 WADA Code provides that “in cases arising
from participation in an International Event or in cases involving
International-Level Athletes, the decision may be exclusively appealed
to CAS.”109
The legal effect of sports arbitration has been profound and
allowed ISOs to once again unilaterally regulate the global labour
markets for players. In a 2016 paper on the development of football’s
labour market regulations following the Bosman decision, legal
academic Antoine Duval wrote:
Thanks to the accommodating stance of Swiss
arbitration law towards the use of transnational private
rules in international arbitration, the CAS is in practice
disregarding national law when adjudicating on
disputes based on the FIFA Regulations for the Status
and Transfer of Players (FIFA RSTP). Consequently,
the FIFA RSTP is very much the only source of law
applying to disputes linked with international transfers
and contracts of football players (and coaches).110

106. Id. Article 57.2 at 54.
107. Id. Article 59 at 55.
108. Id. Article 59.3 at 55.
109. World Anti-Doping Agency [WADA] World Anti-Doping Code, Article 13.2.1 at 82
(Effective Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.usada.org/wp-content/uploads/wada-2015-world-antidoping-code.pdf. (emphasis added).
110. Antoine Duval, The FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players: Trans-
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The consequence is the emergence of lex sportiva, a transnational
law of sport produced by ISOs and the CAS that is now attracting
considerable academic interest.111 Duval argues that:
…this new legal theoretical perspective must be taken
into account when analysing the Bosman ruling of the
Court of Justice of the European Union and its
aftermath. In other words, the legal and political effects
of the Bosman ruling must be understood as a specific
move in a complex transnational political and legal
game.112
An important question is whether lex sportiva is a legitimate
source of law. Duval identifies the problem:
In the absence of international rules imposed conjointly
by national states, the football world has developed, in
the shadow of Bosman and Swiss arbitration law, a
specific ‘global law without the state’. A global law
which is not the product of a global democracy but of a
messy, invisible, political process involving a plurality
of actors representing a conflicting set of interests. This
obviously raises burning questions of legitimacy, which
go way beyond the scope of the present article. To point
out the prevalence of this peculiar and influential set of
private rules is already an important step in critically
engaging with this particular dimension of the
problem.113
For lex sportiva to be legitimate as a system of law, it must, at a
minimum, respect and fulfil the fundamental human rights of the
people who are the subject of that law – the players.114 The CAS,
however, was specifically established to deal with sports related
disputes, not matters of human rights.115 As Professor Ruggie noted in

National Law Making in the Shadow of Bosman, ASSER INST. (Apr. 8, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2760263.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See generally Dimitrios P. Panagiotopoulos, Lex Sportiva and International
Legitimacy Governing: Protection of Professional Players, 8 U.S. China L. Rev. 121 (2011).
See also supra note 110.
115. See generally COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT http://www.tas-cas.org/en/generalinformation/frequently-asked-questions.html.
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his report to FIFA:
If an arbitration system is going to deal effectively with
human rights-related complaints, it needs certain
procedural and substantive protections to be able to
deliver on that promise. While the FIFA dispute
resolution system and the CAS’ 300-plus arbitrators
who sit at the peak of the system may be well equipped
to resolve a great variety of football-related disputes,
they generally lack human rights expertise.116
Further, should the arbitral system fail to respect the human rights
of the players, there are considerable barriers to them accessing a
judicial remedy. In addition to the legal constraints already noted, there
are substantial political and practical ones.117 Professor Ruggie referred
to these when reporting to FIFA on a case involving alleged gender
discrimination:
While FIFA’s regulations contain formal exceptions to
the prohibition of legal claims, in practice the system
seems more like a closed loop. For example, players
from several countries participating in the 2015
Women’s World Cup in Canada filed a complaint with
the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario on grounds of
gender discrimination. Clearly, they were not prevented
from accessing a public tribunal. But when they did so,
they were allegedly threatened with suspension from
their teams and from participating in the Cup…(I)n
cases that raise significant human rights issues, the
ability for players to access effective remedy—
including, where they so choose, through domestic
courts or tribunals—must be a real and not merely a
theoretical possibility.118
Duval also commented on this, stating: “Even if de jure players
… have the possibility to bring their disputes in front of national courts,
de facto their careers are too short to be wasted on intricate and
uncertain legal battles.”119

116. For the Game. For the World. FIFA and Human Rights, supra note 28 at 26.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. The FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players: Trans-National Law
Making in the Shadow of Bosman, supra, note 110.
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III. THE VOICE AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PLAYERS
A.

NORMALISATION OF THE RIGHT OF PLAYERS TO
ORGANISE

The effort on the part of professional athletes to exercise their
fundamental rights under international labour standards to organise
and form unions for the protection of their interests is now becoming
common place. On one “imperfect”120 but well researched estimate:
…in 1973 there were eleven sports which had formed
player bodies, spread across 25 nations with the
majority of both concentrated in Europe and North
America. Since then, there has been a dramatic increase
in player associations in numerous sports. As of
November 2016, there are 226 player organisations
(174 player associations and 52 independent
contractors) operating in 35 sports and 86
countries/national groupings. Five associations
emerged in 2016 alone…In terms of player bodies as a
whole, this is an increase of 461 percent; for player
associations, an increase of exactly 600 per cent, and
260 per cent for independent contractors.121
International sport is continuing to see the emergence of global
player associations, including in sports which conduct some of the
world’s most prestigious and lucrative MSEs. For example, FIFPro,
the world footballers’ association, represents approximately 65,000
professional footballers through national player associations in over
sixty countries, whilst the International Rugby Players’ Association
(“IRPA”) and the Federation of International Cricketers’ Associations
(“FICA”) respectively represent the vast majority of the world’s
professional rugby players and cricketers in the same manner.122 The
World Players Association (“World Players”), established in
December 2014 as an autonomous sector of the UNI Global Union,
represents over 85,000 professional athletes through FIFPro, FICA,
IRPA, EU Athletes, the NFLPA, the National Hockey League Players
120. Braham Dabscheck, Forming Teams of their Own: the Dramatic Emergence of
Player Associations Across the Globe, 26 January 2017, LawInSport,
https://www.lawinsport.com/articles/item/forming-teams-of-their-own-the-dramaticemergence-of-player-associations-across-the-globe
121. Id.
122. FIFPRO WORLD PLAYERS’ UNION https://www.fifpro.org/en/about-fifpro/about-fifpro;
IRPA
http://irpa-rugby.com/;
FICA
FED’N
OF
INT’L
CRICKETERS’
ASS’NS
http://www.thefica.com/about/ (last visited May 11, 2017).
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Association (“NHLPA”), the National Basketball Players Association
(“NBPA”), the Japanese Professional Baseball Players Association
(“JPBPA”), and the Australian Athletes’ Alliance (“AAA”).123
Together, these bodies comprise more than 100 national player
associations in over sixty countries.124
The growth in player unionism at the national, regional and global
levels clearly has important implications for world sport. It will have
to develop the capacity to deal with rising unionisation density with its
most valuable workforce at a time when unionisation around the world
is in decline. According to Dabscheck:
…the growth in both the number of player associations
and their coalescing into federations/confederations is
interesting from a sports perspective, but is of more
significance for industrial relations scholars. Both of
these developments are in the opposite direction to that
which has occurred in traditional or mainstream
industrial relations. The ability of traditional unions to
organise and represent workers has been in decline in
response to the forces of neo-liberalism as enshrined in
aggressive stances by employers, governments and
state institutions. Between 1975, a year after Scoville
made his observation and 2014, the percentage of
workers who are members of unions in Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”)
countries has fallen from 47 to 16.7 per cent. And neoliberalism has made it difficult, if not impossible for
unions to organise globally to defend the wages and
working conditions of members. Unions have been in
decline; but not in the increasingly varied world of
sports.125
The player unions are also express in their commitment to
ensuring the application of internationally recognised human rights to
the work of their members, and emphasise that they operate
independently and democratically. The Nyon Declaration of
November 2011, which was made following a meeting of global,
regional, national and individual player associations held in the offices
123. UNI
Global
Union,
THE
WORLD
PLAYERS’
ASS’N,
http://uniglobalunion.org/sectors/sport/worldplayersassociation (last visited May 2017).
124. Id.
125. Forming Teams of their Own: the Dramatic Emergence of Player Associations
Across the Globe, supra, note 120.
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of UNI Global Union, reads:
We, the independent and democratically elected
representatives of (thousands of) top athletes from
around the world, today establish a federation of world
player associations.
We take this action based on certain core principles and
to address a crisis in the governance of world sport
organisations that have removed the athlete from the
center of sport. There is no sport without athletes…
We declare that world sport organisations, and
governments, must respect national and international
law as well as the fundamental rights of athletes as
citizens and workers, including the right to organise
collectively in player associations and unions…
We stand for the equal treatment of all athletes
regardless of their ethnic background, religion, gender
or sexual orientation…126
B.

OVERVIEW OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES
CONFRONTING PLAYERS

Players, like everyone, need government and business to act to
ensure that their human rights are protected and respected. Even with
the UNGPs applying to ISOs as multi-national enterprises of
considerable scale and scope,127 the present circumstances confronting
players identify at least three broad areas of human rights risk which
this paper will consider.
(1) The Right to Organise and Collectively Bargain
Despite the central role of the players in the delivery of sport and
the normalisation of unionisation, they are commonly denied the right
to organise and collectively bargain. Most notably, there is an
institutional preference on the part of many ISOs, including the IOC,
to regulate the mode of athlete representation within the sporting
framework without regard to ILO standards.128

126. Nyon
Declaration
(Nov.
15,
2011)
http://www.uniglobalunion.org/sites/default/files/imce/world_players_2011_nyon_declaratio
n.pdf.
127. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 9.
128. Mega-Sporting Events Platform for Human Rights, Athletes’ Rights and Mega-
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There are two broad models of athlete representation in relation
to ISOs and MSEs: (1) the mode of athlete consultation is regulated by
the ISO;129 and (2) the ISO recognises and negotiates with a players’
association which operates at the global level, and facilitates and
encourages negotiations between employers and player unions as well
as other interested stakeholders, both under the regulations of the sport
and relevant labour law.130 This may even see a MSE being conducted
as a joint venture between employers and the players’ association.
(a) ISO Regulated Athlete Consultation
Made up of sixteen current and former Olympic athletes, the IOC
Athletes’ Commission is established pursuant to Rule 21 of the
Olympic Charter and provides the vehicle for consultation with
athletes within the Olympic Movement.131 Administratively supported
by the IOC sports department, the Athletes’ Commission’s mission:
is to ensure that the athletes’ viewpoint remains at the
heart of the Olympic Movement decisions. To that
effect, the Commission is invited by the IOC President
to submit proposals, recommendations and/or reports to
the IOC Executive Board or the IOC Session. In a next
step, the Commission develops toolkits, guidelines and
projects to support athletes on and off the field of play.
The Commission members have representation (on) all
relevant IOC commissions, including the IOC
Executive Board, subject to the applicable rules of the
Olympic Charter.132
Significantly, the responsibilities of the IOC Athletes’
Commission include, within the IOC, to “(r)epresent athletes
throughout the Olympic Movement and give input on activities related
to the implementation of Olympic Agenda 2020, specifically focusing
on protecting and supporting clean athletes, both on and off the field
of play…”133 Further, within the Olympic Movement the Athletes’
Sporting
Events,
SPORTING
CHANCE
WHITE
PAPER
4.2
(Jan.
2017),
https://www.ihrb.org/uploads/reports/MSE_Platform%2C_Athletes_Rights_and_MegaSporting_Events%2C_Jan._2017.pdf.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Int’l Olympic Comm. [IOC], Olympic Charter Rule 21 at 51 (effective Aug. 2,
2016), https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf. See also Athletes’
Commission, OLYMPICS, https://www.olympic.org/athletes-commission.
132. Athletes’ Commission, OLYMPICS, https://www.olympic.org/athletes-commission.
133. Id.
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Commission is responsible for “[l]ead[ing] the Athletes’ Engagement
Strategy to liaise, communicate and engage with athletes worldwide .
. . include[ing] developing the Olympic Athletes’ Hub, and being
present at the Olympic Games and Youth Olympic Games to interact
with athletes, as well as liaising with relevant IOC Recognised
Organisations such as International Federations, WADA, the IPC,
WOA, ANOC, Continental Associations, CAS and others…”134
The Olympic Charter encourages the development of athlete
commissions throughout the Olympic Movement. For example, the
existence of an athletes’ commission within an ISO or National
Olympic Committee is relevant to the question of IOC membership.135
The Athletes’ Commission Charter of the Australian Olympic
Committee (“AOC”), for example, provides that the commission’s role
is to “advise” the executive of the AOC and obliges each member of
the commission not to act in the best interests of the athletes or even
sport, but “solely in the best interests of the Committee (i.e. the AOC)
and its members as a whole.”136
WADA similarly, has established an athletes’ committee. The
stated role of the seventeen person body is to “serve as the voice of
clean athletes, encouraging integrity and fairness for sport and
athletes.”137 The objectives and key activities of the committee include
providing “insight to and feedback on the World Anti-Doping Program
including the Code, testing standards, ADAMS etc.” and acting as
“ambassadors and spokespersons for WADA and doping-free sport.”138
It is appointed by the Committee’s chair and the President of WADA
in consultation with WADA’s Director General.139 The committee’s
terms of reference further provide:
Confidentiality. All Committee members are required
to sign a confidentiality agreement upon appointment.
Communications and Media. All members must read
and agree to comply with WADA’s Media Relations
134. Id.
135. Int’l Olympic Comm. [IOC], Olympic Charter Rule 2.3.4 at 41 (effective Aug. 2,
2016), https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf.
136. Austl. Olympic Comm., Athletes’ Commission Charter, (Aug. 6, 2015), http://aoccdn.s3.amazonaws.com/corporate/live/files/dmfile/Athletes%20Commission%20Charter_6
%20August%202015.pdf (emphasis added).
137. World Anti-Doping Agency, Athlete Committee, (Dec., 2014), https://www.wadaama.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/wada-athlete-committee-terms-of-reference2014.pdf.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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policy (as attached). If a member should receive a
request for an interview in relation to their role in
WADA or WADA’s work in the fight against doping in
sport, they should consult first with the WADA Media
Relations Senior Manager or (if absent), with the
WADA Communications Director.
Funding Support. WADA shall provide the necessary
administration and operational resources for
Committee meetings.140
(b) World Player Associations
Established in 1965, FIFPro is the most developed world players’
union. Under the terms of a memorandum of understanding signed in
2006, it is exclusively recognised by FIFA as the representative body
of the world’s professional footballers.141 Similarly, FIFPro recognises
FIFA as football’s international governing body.142 The cooperation
between FIFA and FIFPro includes:
• FIFA committing to negotiate all changes to international
regulations that affect player transfers, contracts and
registrations FIFA RSTP, and agreeing not to implement any
changes without FIFPro’s agreement.143
• An international dispute resolution mechanism (the FIFA
Dispute Resolution Chamber) to resolve employment related
disputes between clubs and players, with FIFPro nominating
50% of the arbitrators.144
• FIFPro representation within key committees, such as the FIFA
Players’ Status Committee and the FIFA Stakeholders
Committee.145
• FIFPro working with FIFA’s confederations, including the
Union of European Football Associations (“UEFA”), where a
formal European social dialogue has been established under the
140. Id.
141. Memorandum
of
Understanding,
FIFPRO
(Nov.
2,
2006),
http://www.asser.nl/upload/sportslaw-webroot/cms/documents/cms_sports_id78_1_FIFProMOU-FinalSig2-E-20061102%5b1%5d.pdf.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See generally Players’ Status Committee, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/committees/committee=1882032/index.html (last visited).

4_FINAL_SCHWAB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

36

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

11/14/17 7:54 PM

[Vol. 32:4

auspices of the European Commission to address matters such
as minimum contract requirements for players.146 A four party
autonomous agreement was concluded in 2012 on this subject
between FIFPro’s European division, the European Club
Association (“ECA”), the European Professional Football
Leagues (“EPFL”) and UEFA.147
As this paper will consider, the relationship between FIFPro and
FIFA is not without its challenges, especially on the key issues of the
player transfer system, the protection of player wages and dispute
resolution. For example, FIFPro has supported efforts by athletes to
access remedies through litigation and formal processes. It is
supporting German speed skater Claudia Pechstein’s legal challenge
to the CAS,148 and in 2015 filed a complaint in the European
Commission against the anti-competitive effect of the operation of the
FIFA RSTP.149
World Rugby also recognises IRPA, the International Rugby
Players’ Association.150 The admission of Rugby Sevens into the
Olympic Games resulted in the establishment of a rugby athletes’
commission in accordance with IOC requirements through an
agreement between World Rugby and IRPA.151 Among the
commission’s highest priorities is the advancement of the relationship
146. Memorandum
of
Understanding,
FIFPRO
(Nov.
2,
2006),
http://www.asser.nl/upload/sportslaw-webroot/cms/documents/cms_sports_id78_1_FIFProMOU-FinalSig2-E-20061102%5b1%5d.pdf.
147. See Press Release, FIFPro, FIFPRO, UEFA, ECA, EPFL Sign Minimum
Requirements (April 19, 2012) https://www.fifpro.org/news/fifpro-uefa-eca-epfl-signminimum-requirements/en/. See also Press Release, European Commission, Andor and Platini
Welcome New Agreement on Contract Rights for Footballers (April 19, 2012)
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-267_en.htm?locale=en.
See also Press
Release, European Commission, New Agreement on Contract Rights for Footballers (April
19,
2012)
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=fr&catId=329&newsId=1279&furtherNews=yes.
148. FIFPro Backs Claudia Pechstein’s Legal Battle, FIFPRO (July 14, 2015)
https://www.fifpro.org/news/fifpro-backs-claudia-pechstein-s-legal-battle/en/.
149. See FIFPro’s EU competition law complaint – executive summary, FIFPRO (Sept. 18,
2015),
https://www.fifpro.org/attachments/article/6156/FIFPro%20Complaint%20Executive%20Su
mmary.pdf. Juan de Dios Crespo Perez & Paolo Torchetti, A Legal and Policy Analysis of
FIFPro’s Proposal to Reform the Regulation of Professional Football Contracts,
WHO’SWHOLEGAL (Nov. 2015) http://whoswholegal.com/news/features/article/32715/a-legalpolicy-analysis-fifpros-proposal-reform-regulation-professional-football-contracts.
150. Daniel Etchells, World Rugby and IRPA Strengthen Ties at Athletes’ Commission,
INSIDE THE GAMES (Nov. 21, 2015), http://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1031850/worldrugby-and-irpa-strengthen-ties-at-athletes-commission.
151. IRPA Player Representatives Follow up on 2015 Rugby Athletes’ Commission, IRPA
(2015), http://irpa-rugby.com/news/.
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between World Rugby and IRPA through a “joint commitment to
developing (a) revised memorandum of understanding between World
Rugby and IRPA to provide a stronger blueprint of collaboration on
international issues affecting players and the game as a whole.”152
The World Cup of Hockey 2016 in Toronto, Canada, featured
eight teams competing for a best-on-best international hockey
championship: Team Canada, Team Czech Republic, Team Finland,
Team Russia, Team Sweden, Team USA, Team Europe and Team
North America.153 More than 150 of the best players in the National
Hockey League (“NHL”) participated in this tournament.154 The
tournament was a joint effort of the NHLPA and NHL, in cooperation
with the International Ice Hockey Federation (“IIHF”).155 The
tournament was played on NHL-sized rinks using NHL rules and
officiated by NHL officials.156 Other competition matters – such as the
anti-doping policy governing the tournament, the framework and
procedure for supplementary discipline, the medical protocols, media
and broadcasting policies and access, etc. – were the responsibility of
the NHL and NHLPA in consultation with third parties, including the
IIHF, where appropriate.157
Article 24 of the 2012 – 2022 Collective Bargaining Agreement
(“CBA”) between the NHL and NHLPA deals with international
hockey under the auspices of a joint “international committee.”158 The
CBA relevantly provides in Article 24.5:
The NHL and the NHLPA shall continue to work
together to jointly create and exploit other international
projects and initiatives involving NHL Players other
than International Hockey Games, including games,
series, events or contests (e.g., the World Cup of
Hockey, European Champions’ League, Victoria Cup
Competition, Olympic participation, etc.). All revenues
from such projects and initiatives (net of expenses
152. Id.
153. WORLD CUP OF HOCKEY 2016, https://www.wch2016.com/info/teams.
154. World Cup of Hockey 2016 Rosters Finalized, NHLPA (May 27, 2016),
http://www.nhlpa.com/news/world-cup-of-hockey-2016-rosters-finalized.
155. 2016 World Cup: Frequently Asked Questions, WORLD CUP OF HOCKEY 2016,
https://www.wch2016.com/info/world-cup-of-hockey-faq.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Collective Bargaining Agreement between National Hockey League and National
Hockey
League
Players’
Association,
Feb.
15,
2013,
http://cdn.agilitycms.com/nhlpacom/PDF/NHL_NHLPA_2013_CBA.pdf.
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incurred pursuant to budgets approved by the
International Committee, including without limiting the
generality of the foregoing, Direct Costs and NHL and
NHLPA staffing costs) shall be excluded from [Hockey
Related Revenues] pursuant to Section 50.1(b)(xviii)
and divided equally between the NHL and NHLPA.159
Similar to Hockey, the CBA between the MLB and the Major
League Baseball Players Association (“MLBPA”) deals with
“international play.”160 Article XXV(K)(4) of the CBA provides that
all international play is subject to joint cooperation between MLB, the
MLBPA, and the MLB clubs.161 The World Baseball Classic,
baseball’s world championship of nations, is conducted by the World
Baseball Classic, Inc. (“WBCI”), a company created at the direction of
MLB and the MLBPA to operate the World Baseball Classic
tournament.162 The tournament, which is sanctioned by the World
Baseball Softball Confederation (“WBSC”), is supported by MLB, the
MLBPA, Nippon Professional Baseball (“NPB”), the Korea Baseball
Organization (“KBO”), their respective players’ associations and other
leagues and players from around the world.163
(2) The Regulation of Player and Athlete Rights
The prevalence given by ISOs to notions such as the autonomy
and specificity of sport when addressing the rights of athletes and
players across sport should be measured in the light of the
extraordinary and far-reaching complexity of athlete regulation as
developed by ISOs, and the difficulties athletes confront in having
their rights upheld, and in accessing an effective remedy where they
are breached. The extent of athlete regulation is illustrated by the Index
of Athletes Rights & Rules published by the United States Olympic
Committee (“USOC”) Athlete Ombudsman.164 The twelve page index
cites U.S. sports specific legislation, the USOC Bylaws, the Olympic
Charter, the WADA Code (and related documents), the requirements
159. Id.
160. 2012-2016 Basic Agreement, MLB, http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf (last
visited May 11, 2017).
161. Id.
162. About the 2017 World Baseball Classic, WORLDBASEBALLCLASSIC,
https://www.worldbaseballclassic.com/info/about (last visited May 11, 2016).
163. Id.
164. USOC Athlete Ombudsman, Index of Athletes’ Rights & Rules, U.S. OLYMPIC
COMM.,
http://www.teamusa.org/~/media/TeamUSA/Documents/AthleteOmbudsman/Athlete-Rights/Index-of-Athletes-Rights-2.pdf?la=en (last visited May 11,
2017).
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of the United States Anti-Doping Agency (“USADA”), USOC policies
(which address matters such as the commercial rights and obligations
of athletes, and what performance apparel they may wear), selection
procedures, dispute resolution, arbitration, athlete participation in
governance matters and political matters, among other things.165
Similarly, to participate in the 2016 Rio Olympics, Australian
athletes were required to sign a sixty page “partnership agreement”
with the AOC.166 The agreement is legally controversial. It denies the
existence of an employment relationship between the athletes and the
AOC,167 contains onerous provisions regarding the disclosure of
information, denies the athlete recourse to the courts, imposes
restraints on how the athlete may conduct commercial activities and
requires the athlete to release and indemnify the AOC on broad
terms.168 Payment to the athlete is not provided, although some athletes
may access funding through various sport and government
programs.169 The agreement incorporates by reference eight external
documents (themselves legally complex), including the AOC
Constitution, AOC guidelines and bylaws on funding, commercial
activities and selection, the Olympic Charter, the WADA Code and the
IOC Code of Ethics, the latter of which effectively requires all athletes
to waive their data protection rights as a condition of participation in
the Olympics.170 The front page of the agreement reads:
Your selection to participate in the 2016 Olympic
Games as a member of the 2016 Australian Olympic
Team is conditional on you entering into this
165. Id.
166. Team Membership Agreement – Athletes, AUSTL. OLYMPIC COMM., http://aocrio2016.s3.amazonaws.com/files/dmfile/ATHLETES%20%202016%20Australian%20Olympic%20Team%20Membership%20Agreement%20%20FINAL%20w%20Schedules_201015.pdf (last visited May 11, 2016).
167. See
generally,
Sahinovic
v.
Wiener
Gebietskrankenkasse,
Das
Bundesverwaltungsgericht [Magistrates’ Court of Appeal, Vienna, Austria] March 10, 2017
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/ (last visited July 1, 2017).
168. Team Membership Agreement – Athletes, AUSTL. OLYMPIC COMM., http://aocrio2016.s3.amazonaws.com/files/dmfile/ATHLETES%20%202016%20Australian%20Olympic%20Team%20Membership%20Agreement%20%20FINAL%20w%20Schedules_201015.pdf (last visited May 11, 2016).
169. See generally Dr. Rhonda Jolly, Sports Funding: Federal Balancing Act, Parliament
of
Austl.
(June
27,
2013),
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Librar
y/pubs/BN/2012-2013/SportFunding.
170. Team Membership Agreement – Athletes, AUSTL. OLYMPIC COMM., http://aocrio2016.s3.amazonaws.com/files/dmfile/ATHLETES%20%202016%20Australian%20Olympic%20Team%20Membership%20Agreement%20%20FINAL%20w%20Schedules_201015.pdf (last visited May 11, 2016).
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Agreement and observing its terms.
You should carefully read this Agreement so as to
understand its terms and the consequences flowing
from any breach of its terms.171
(3) The Widespread Failure to Respect Player Rights
In the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber, football has a
grievance mechanism for the resolution of international labour
disputes between clubs and players.172 However, professional
footballers still have great difficulty in having their labour rights
upheld throughout the world. FIFPro has undertaken extensive
research into the systematic violation of the fundamental rights of
players. For example, in November 2016, FIFPro published the results
of a survey of the working conditions of 14,000 professional athletes.173
It has uncovered many troubling realities faced by players below the
narrow summit of world football. The survey findings show that: 21%
of players are making less than $300 a month, 45% of players make
less than $1,000 a month and 74% of players less than $4,000 a month;
32% of players experience very significant delays in the payment of
their salaries; 14% are forced into bogus self-employment; 8%
experienced discrimination in the workplace based on ethnicity,
religion, sexual orientation or other reasons; 14% experience threats
by fans, club management or other people associated with their
employer; and 10% of players have not completed education beyond
the primary school level.174
Similar findings were revealed in two earlier research reports, the
2012 FIFPro Black Book, Eastern Europe175 and the 2015 FIFPro Asia
Buku Hitam, an unpublished study into issues confronting professional
footballers in Asia and Oceania, including Australia, Hong Kong,
India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Palestine, Singapore
and South Korea.176 Both pieces of research involved extensive player
171. Id.
172. See generally Governance. Players’ status and transfers. Dispute resolution
chamber, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/governance/dispute-resolution-system/index.html (last
visited June 25, 2017).
173. See generally 2016 FIFPRO Global Employment Report Working Conditions in
Professional
Football,
FIFPRO
WORLD
PLAYERS’
UNION,
https://fifpro.org/images/documents-pdf/2016-fifpro-global-employment-report.pdf (2016).
174. Id.
175. See generally FIFPro Black Book Eastern Europe the Problems Professional
Footballers Encounter: Research, FIFPRO (2012), https://www.fifpro.org/images/documentspdf/BLACK-BOOK.pdf.
176. Dr. Jady Hassim, Buku Hitam, working paper.
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surveying and highlight the serious problems confronting professional
footballers, including:
• Approximately one in ten players having their contracts
unjustly terminated, including for reasons such as
injury.177
• Players not being paid in accordance with their contracts.
Specifically, in eastern Europe, over 40%, whilst in
Asia one in four players were not paid on time.178
• Players being forced by their employers to work in
isolation, or train alone, on threat of having to agree to
employment related demands of the employer such as a
transfer or early contract termination.179
• Over 10% of players being subjected to capricious
sanctions and financial penalties by their employers.180
• Around 10% of players being subjected to violence by
fans and club management.181
• Around 10% of players being subjected to bullying and
harassment.182
• Widespread racism. Specifically, over 10% of players
complained of being subjected to a racist act in eastern
Europe.183
• Almost 12% of players in eastern Europe and 7% in Asia
and Oceania being approached to fix the result of a
match, often in circumstances of duress.184
As Professor Ruggie noted in his report to FIFA, “[w]hile the
immediate cause (of such abuse) is typically clubs, players seeking
transfers out of such abusive situations appear to have limited options

177. See generally FIFPro Black Book Eastern Europe the Problems Professional
Footballers Encounter: Research, supra, note 175; see also Buku Hitam, supra, note 176.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Buku Hitam, supra, note 176.
181. See generally FIFPro Black Book Eastern Europe the Problems Professional
Footballers Encounter: Research, supra, note 175; see also Buku Hitam, supra note 176.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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in practice.”185 Accordingly, the problems players confront with the
transfer system are interconnected with the lack of protection of their
wages and their incapacity to access an effective remedy.
With effect from 1 May 2015, FIFA imposed a regulatory ban on
third parties such as agents from owning the “economic rights” arising
from the transfer of employment of players due to the widespread
nature of the practice, indicating the existence of a significant market
for such activities.186 Indeed, Professor Ruggie also wrote:
…if large numbers of reports are to be believed, human
trafficking in football continues at significant rates. The
sources of trafficked players are most likely to be in
West Africa and parts of Latin America. Their typical
destination is lower-tier European and Asian clubs,
although many trafficked players end up in the streets
rather than on pitches. The vast majority of trafficked
players are said to be minors. FIFA has been proactive
in establishing rules to combat trafficking through the
legal transfer system. But neither the rules nor the
available resources extend to cover rogue recruiters and
agents, unsanctioned football academies, and the
known trafficking routes by which players are sent to
clubs on other continents operating within FIFA’s
ambit. This means that there are likely to be players in
the FIFA governed world of football who have been
trafficked—and that they include minors.187
These facts, concerning as they are, certainly do not completely
set out the human rights risks confronting players in football and
beyond. For example, some ISOs impose rules that prevent Muslim
women from playing sport wearing a hijab.188 Additionally, 2016 saw
the widespread failure on the part of WADA to secure the confidential
data of athletes uploaded to its anti-doping data base, including
confidential medical records,189 rising concerns in many sports about
185. For the Game. For the World, supra, note 28, at 25.
186. Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, FIFA at 21,
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/02/70/95/52/regulationso
nthestatusandtransferofplayersnov2016weben_neutral.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2017).
187. For the Game. For the World, supra note 28, at 25.
188. See Shireen Ahmed, Will Basketball Do the Right Thing and Lift its Ban on the
Hijab?,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
26,
2017,
6:00
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2017/jan/26/basketball-governing-body-fiba-hijab.
189. See Cyber Hack Update: Data leak concerning 41 athletes from 13 countries and 17
sports, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.wada-
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the long term health impacts of concussion,190 and the revelation of
widespread abuse of child athletes by English football clubs, now
being thoroughly reviewed with the assistance of UNICEF.191 These
developments all point to a systemic failure on the part of sport to
embed the rights of the players within their governance framework.
IV. EMBEDDING PLAYER RIGHTS
A.

INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED HUMAN RIGHTS
AND LEX SPORTIVA

The challenge and opportunity for all ISOs, including the IOC and
FIFA, is to uphold their constitutional commitments to human rights
and legitimize lex sportiva by embedding the fundamental human
rights of the people at the centre of sport – the players. The UNGPs
provide the framework for sport to do so in a manner which is now
consistent with the policy decisions made by the IOC and FIFA in 2016
and 2017. Whilst considerable substantive and procedural reform and
negotiation would be required, the realistic outcome is a global sports
law that complies with internationally recognised human rights and is
enforceable through a properly designed and agreed grievance
mechanism, thereby ensuring access to an effective remedy for those
who have not had their human rights respected and upheld.
The development of lex sportiva in this way would present the
third great development in the law as it applies to players. The first,
running from Eastham through to Bosman and reviewed in Part II(B)
of this paper, recognised the rights of players under the law of the land
including as employees. The second, as explained in Part II(C), has
ama.org/en/media/news/2016-09/cyber-hack-update-data-leak-concerning-41-athletes-from13-countries-and-17; Cyber Hack Update: Data leak concerning 20 athletes from 14 countries
and 13 sports, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.wadaama.org/en/media/news/2016-10/cyber-hack-update-data-leak-concerning-20-athletes-from14-countries-and-13.
190. See FIFA helps concussion issue move forward, FIFA (Nov. 2, 2016),
http://www.fifa.com/development/news/y=2016/m=11/news=fifa-helps-concussion-issuemove-forward-2847636.html; Sy Mukherjee, The NFL’s Concussion Problem Isn’t Getting
Much Better, FORTUNE (Jan. 29, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/01/29/nfl-concussions-2016/;
Henry Young, Australian Rugby Union tackles concussion problem with blue card, CNN
(Mar. 24, 2017, 1:38 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2017/03/23/sport/blue-card-aru-rugbyconcussion-warren-mcdonald-australia/.
191. See Katrin Benhold, Child Sexual Abuse Scandal Rocks U.K. Soccer, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/world/europe/soccer-uk-sexualabuse-andy-woodward.html?_r=0; Sarfraz Manzoor, Britain’s Soccer Sex Abuse Scandal,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/19/opinion/britains-soccersex-abuse-scandal.html?_r=0.
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been the development of lex sportiva after the Bosman decision by
ISOs coupling the notions of specificity and autonomy of sport with
compulsory arbitration. This is defeating the capacity of players to
enjoy their rights under national law, and subjecting players to a
specific legal framework rooted in the interests of the ISOs and the
employers and which is operating without the State.
By being based on the dominant position that ISOs have in their
dealings with players, lex sportiva lacks legitimacy. The lack of
legitimacy is rooted in four main features: (1) the acknowledged
failures and conflicts of interest within the governance of ISOs;192 (2)
the lack of involvement of the people bound by the law in the making
of it – the players;193 (3) the ongoing violation of the rights of players
especially vulnerable players who are, naturally, the ones most in need
of the protection of the law;194 and (4) the law’s lack of recognition and
compliance with internationally recognised human rights.195 While
outside the scope of this paper, there are also grounds to suggest a fifth
– lex sportiva’s ineffectiveness in dealing with the sporting objectives
that theoretically underpin it.196
B.

THE APPLICATION OF THE UNGPs to ISOs

The UNGPs are “grounded in recognition” of:
(a) States’ existing obligations to respect, protect and

192. See supra notes 61 to 70.
193. See generally Lisa A. Kihl & Lucie Thibault, Athletes, Athletes’ Commissions, and
the Governance of International Sport Organisations, U. OF MINN., BROCK U. (Sept. 21, 2012),
https://www.easm.net/download/2012/d2d32ec712763d5589028c28cb94b2d0.pdf.
194. See generally David Paulo, HUMAN RIGHTS IN YOUTH SPORT (2005); See also
Additionally vulnerable, SPORT AND DEV, https://www.sportanddev.org/en/learn-more/childprotection-and-safeguarding/additionally-vulnerable-0 (last visited Apr. 8, 2017).
195. See
generally
Sport
and
Human
Rights,
AMNESTY
INT’L,
http://www.sportandhumanrights.org/wordpress/ (last visited May 11, 2017); Sarah Joseph,
Sport and the Law: Sport and Human Rights: Closer than you think, 35 ALTERNATIVE L. J.
235 (2010).
196. See WADA ineffective on doping too – Moynihan, BBC SPORT (July 25, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/sport/athletics/36888420; WADA testing “ineffective”, says Australian
Olympic chief, REUTERS (Feb. 28, 2013, 11:41 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/usdoping-australia-idUSBRE92005R20130301; Katrin Bennhold, Child Sexual Abuse Scandal
Rocks
U.K.
Soccer,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
13,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/world/europe/soccer-uk-sexual-abuse-andywoodward.html?_r=0; Sarfraz Manzoor, Britain’s Soccer Sex Abuse Scandal, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/19/opinion/britains-soccer-sex-abusescandal.html; Brendan Schwab, Why Australian sport must cut ties with WADA, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD (June 15, 2014), http://www.smh.com.au/sport/why-australian-sportsmust-cut-ties-with-wada-20140615-zs8k1.html
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fulfil human rights and fundamental freedoms;
(b) The role of business enterprises as specialized
organs of society performing specialized functions,
required to comply with all applicable laws and to
respect human rights;
(c) The need for rights and obligations to be matched to
appropriate and effective remedies when breached.197
The UNGPs apply “…to all States and to all business enterprises,
both transnational and others, regardless of their size, sector, location,
ownership and structure.”198 Accordingly, it can be safely said that the
UNGPs apply to ISOs and all sporting organisations within the world
of professional sport, including leagues, clubs, national associations,
academies, dispute resolution services, regulatory and enforcement
agencies, and other enterprises such as player agencies. It can also be
safely said that the UNGPs include the human rights of the players
within their purview.
In his report to FIFA, Professor Ruggie wrote:
FIFA acts vigorously to develop and enforce
regulations related to its institutional and commercial
interests. But when it comes to many other matters,
even where the rules are robust, FIFA’s capacity to
ensure their implementation is often lacking, and FIFA
relies heavily on self-regulation by the parties to which
the rules are addressed.199
This point is equally applicable to all ISOs and particularly
relevant in the context of lex sportiva, its construction without the State
and the capacity of ISOs to ensure its enforcement without regard to
national law. Having promulgated such a special law in respect of
players, the ISOs have an increased responsibility to ensure its
compliance with internationally recognised human rights in
accordance with the UNGPs.200 The “Foundational Principles” of the
corporate responsibility to respect human rights include: “Business
enterprises should respect human rights. This means that they should
avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address any
197. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 9 at 1.
198. Id.
199. For the Game. For the World, supra note 28 at 27. See generally FIFA’s Human
Rights Policy May 2017 Edition, supra, note 51.
200. Id.
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adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved.”201
By respecting human rights, ISOs would be meeting a “global
standard of expected conduct for all business enterprises wherever they
operate.”202 The standard exists “independently of States’ abilities and
/ or willingness to fulfil their own human rights obligations” and “over
and above national laws and regulations protecting human rights.”203
Moreover, “enterprises should not undermine States’ abilities to meet
their own human rights obligations, including by actions that might
weaken the integrity of judicial processes.”204 The impact of lex
sportiva¸ coupled with the power of ISOs, can defeat local judicial
processes by denying players access to judicial remedies or subjecting
them to an arbitral process which gives paramountcy to the regulations
of ISOs over national law.
C.

IMPLEMENTING THE UNGPs

The implementation of the UNGPs “protect, respect and remedy”
framework would enable ISOs to proactively address the human rights
concerns of players in their decision-making processes.205 The starting
point for ISOs to effectively implement the UNGPs is to make three
key commitments:
(1) The constitutional commitments made by ISOs such
as the IOC and FIFA should be replicated by other
ISOs, and translated into daily actions and decisions.
This includes the effort to implement the UNGPs being
reflected in and supported by the decision-making of
the leadership of the ISO and its governing bodies.
Clear expectations should be set and resources
allocated throughout the administration and operations
of the ISO.
(2) A proactive approach must be taken, including the
assessment of human rights risks across the activities
and relationships of the ISO and building and using
leverage.
(3) Human rights risks should be managed
transparently including by ensuring access to an
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 9 at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at i.v.
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effective remedy for human rights harm. This involves
routinely discussing human rights risks with external
stakeholders.206
(1) A Clear Policy Commitment to Player Rights
Business enterprises “need to know and show they respect human
rights.”207 The Foundational Principles of the UNGPs require business
enterprises to have in place “policies and processes appropriate to their
size and circumstances,” including, under Principle 15(a), a “policy
commitment to meet their responsibility to respect human rights…”208
Further, the responsibility to respect human rights requires that
business enterprises “[s]eek to prevent or mitigate adverse human
rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or
services by their business relationships, even if they have not
contributed to those impacts.”209 As discussed at Part I(A), the
responsibility to respect human rights refers to all “internationally
recognized human rights.”210
With the exception of FIFA’s Human Rights Policy May 2017
Edition,211 such a policy commitment is presently absent from the
world of sport. There is also the absence of a clear policy that is
incorporated within the regulatory regime of ISOs that
comprehensively documents the fundamental human rights of players
that are internationally recognised. The Appendix to this paper sets out
the Universal Declaration of Player Rights (“UDPR”), as adopted by
the Executive Committee of World Players.212 A commitment to the
UDPR by ISOs would provide “the basis for embedding [the ISOs]
responsibility to respect [the] human rights [of the players].”213 This
requires the policy to be approved at “the most senior level of the
business enterprise.”214 The UDPR articulates how internationally
recognised human rights apply to the work and circumstances of the
players.215
Article 6(1) of the UDPR provides that every player “has the right
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

For the Game. For the World., supra note 28, at 28 to 35.
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 9, at 16.
Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 13-14.
FIFA’s Human Rights Policy, supra note 51.
Infra Appendix.
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 9, at 16.
Id.
Infra Appendix.
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to organise and collectively bargain,” a right recognised under the ILO
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its
Follow-Up216 and referred to in Principle 12 of the UNGPs.217 However,
ISOs are far from embedding a policy commitment to this fundamental
right, even though it should, through appropriate policy, “be embedded
from the top of the business enterprise through all its functions, which
otherwise act without awareness or regard for human rights.”218 Indeed,
ISOs commonly remain concerned by any effort on the part of players
to organise.
The response by WADA to the initial moves to establish World
Players in 2011 is an example of the concerns ISOs express with the
organisation of athletes into trade unions. Former WADA Chairman
John Fahey’s minuted remarks to the WADA Foundation Board on 20
November 2011 read:
[The player] associations… were based along the lines
of a union and took their authority from membership,
which involved receiving paid fees to have people look
at what were described as the conditions under which
they operated. Those conditions were of course relevant
to the pay received to play sport. He thought that it was
incumbent on all who believed that sport was a very
different and separate operation to other workplaces to
make that clear. In his opinion, the least amount of
credibility given to these people (the athlete unions),
the better. They must be seen for what they were: a
union, and if individual sportsmen and women wanted
that, it was their choice. But WADA should make this
clear at every opportunity possible and under no
circumstance would it recognise them as
representatives of the sportsmen and women of the
world.219
However, some 80,000 players, represented through legitimate
trade unions and player associations, are bound by the WADA Code,
which forms a fundamental term of their employment or involvement
216. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up,
supra, note 34.
217. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 9, at 13.
218. Id. at 17.
219. Minutes of the WADA Foundation Board Meeting, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, at
48
(Nov.
20,
2011),
https://www.wadaama.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/wada_foundation_board_meeting_minutes_20nov2
011_eng_final.pdf (emphasis added).

4_FINAL_SCHWAB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

11/14/17 7:54 PM

WHEN WE KNOW BETTER, WE DO BETTER

49

in sport.220 These players and their organisations constitute World
Players, as shown in Table 1:
Table 1221
Affiliate

Country

AAA
EU Athletes
FICA
FIFPro
IRPA
JPBPA
NBPA
NFLPA
NHLPA
TOTAL

AUS
NED
ENG
NED
NZL
JPN
USA
USA
CAN

Player
associations
5
27
7
60
10
1
1
1
1
113

Players
2,529
7,467
1,618
65,000
3,000
735
400
1,800
750
83,299

WADA
jurisdiction
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
79,622

Concerns over athlete unionisation extend across the Olympic
Movement. Mr. John Coates, the Vice President of the IOC, the
President of the AOC and the President of both the CAS and the
International Council of Arbitration for Sport (“ICAS”), the body
responsible for financing and administering the CAS, told Australian
radio in late 2015 that: “[t]hese are the unions who are not elected
representatives of the athletes. I know who they are.”222 When asked
whether he thought players or athletes should not have union bodies
representing them, he said:
I think our position is that all bodies should have
athletes representatives on their board who are elected
by the athletes themselves. That is the case with the
Athletes Commissions in the national federations and
the Australian Olympic Committee. It is not some other
self-appointed body that goes out and negotiates wages
and other matters for them.223

220. See generally Code Signatories, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, https://www.wadaama.org/en/code-signatories (last visited Apr. 8, 2017).
221. Athletes’ Rights and Mega- Sporting Events, supra, note 128 at 21.
222. Tracey Holmes, Olympic boss John Coates ‘embarrassed’ by Rowing Australia ‘right
to silence’ provision oversight, ABC NEWS (Dec. 3, 2015, 8:45 AM),
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-12-04/john-coates-embarrassed-by-rowing-australiaoversight/7000102.
223. Id.
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At the 2017 Sport Accord Convention, Sport Accord’s President
Mr. Patrick Baumann, criticized the apparent political role of Athlete
Commissions despite their regulated power.224 Mr. Baumann, who
holds various positions in sport including IOC member, Secretary
General of the Fédération Internationale de Basketball (“FIBA”),
Council Member of the Association of Summer Olympic International
Federations (“ASOIF”), Board Member of ICAS and IOC
representative on the Foundation Board of WADA,225 stated to the
convention:
Athletes’ Commission(s) are starting to become
political. They have opinions on everything and this can
be a particular problem…The expansion of the role, I
think, should be somehow a little bit controlled. We are
absolutely there to help, to work, and create the best
environment for them to compete. But if it becomes
unionised, we are creating more harm than benefits.226
The right to organise and collectively bargain, as enshrined in
article 20 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and ILO
Conventions 87 and 98 is, of course, a fundamental international
labour standard.227 Recognition and respect for the right to organise and
collectively bargain involves an obligation on the part of employers
and their representatives not to interfere with the independent pursuit
and exercise of that right.228 Article 2 of the Right to Organise and
Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98) of the ILO provides:
1. Workers’ and employers’ organisations shall enjoy
adequate protection against any acts of interference by
each other or each other’s agents or members in their
establishment, functioning or administration.
2. In particular, acts which are designed to promote the
224. See supra notes 131 to 140.
225. Mr. Patrick Baumann, INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE,
https://www.olympic.org/mr-patrick-baumann
226. See Nick Butler, Baumann criticizes political role of sporting Athletes’ Commissions,
INSIDE
THE
GAMES,
(Apr.
4,
2017),
http://www.insidethegames.biz/index.php/articles/1048883/sportaccord-convention-day-two
(emphasis added).
227. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra, note 8; ILO Convention 87,
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, INT’L LAB.
ORGANIZATION (1948), http://blue.lim.ilo.org/cariblex/pdfs/ILO_Convention_87.pdf; ILO
Convention 98, Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, INT’L LAB. ORG.
(1949), http://blue.lim.ilo.org/cariblex/pdfs/ILO_Convention_98.pdf.
228. ILO Convention 98, Art. 2 (1949).
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establishment of workers’ organisations under the
domination of employers or employers’ organisations,
or to support workers’ organisations by financial or
other means, with the object of placing such
organisations under the control of employers or
employers’ organisations, shall be deemed to constitute
acts of interference within the meaning of this Article.229
In May 2017, FIFA, in reporting on its human rights record in
accordance with Professor Ruggie’s recommendations of April 2016,
noted that “[s]ome of the main achievements” included “the
broadening of engagement with football stakeholders, including with
the international union of professional football players FIFPro,
towards enhancing the protection of players’ rights,”230 the
“establishment of a pilot project for the implementation and
development of national dispute resolution chambers, and a
significantly increased engagement with relevant stakeholders, in
particular with organisations representing the interests of professional
footballers.”231
(2) A Player Rights Due Diligence Process
The Foundational Principles of the UNGPs require business
enterprises, in order to meet their responsibility to respect human
rights, to carry out “[a] human rights due diligence process to identify,
prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their impacts on
human rights…”232
Principle 17 sets out the principles of an effective human rights
due diligence:
In order to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for
how they address their adverse human rights impacts,
business enterprises should carry out human rights due
diligence. The process should include assessing actual
and potential human rights impacts, integrating and
acting upon the findings, tracking responses, and
communicating how impacts are addressed. Human
rights due diligence…should be ongoing.233
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id.
FIFA Activity Update on Human Rights May 2017, supra, note 53 at 2.
Id., 16.
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 9, at 16.
Id. at 17-18.
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Principles 20 and 21 require business enterprises to “track the
effectiveness of their response” and “be prepared to communicate this
externally, particularly when concerns are raised by or on behalf of
affected stakeholders.”234
Human rights due diligence is presently absent from key
decisions made by ISOs that affect players. For example, a human
rights due diligence is not undertaken in relation to the making of the
myriad of regulations that affect players. However, according to the
UNGPs, “(h)uman rights due diligence should be initiated as early as
possible in the development of a new activity or relationship, given
that human rights risks can be increased or mitigated already at the
stage of structuring contracts or other agreements.”235 Further, “in order
to gauge human rights risks,” the process of human rights due diligence
should draw on “internal and / or independent external human rights
expertise” and “involve meaningful consultation with potentially
affected groups and other relevant stakeholders, as appropriate to the
size of the business enterprise and the nature and context of the
operation.”236
The undertaking of human rights due diligence involves a
fundamental reversal in the assessment of the player rights impacts of
the decisions of ISOs. As Part II(B) of this paper illustrated, certain
players over time have been willing to sacrifice their short term and
precarious careers to advance the collective interests of the players
through expensive and time consuming litigation.237 The onus – in
terms of the practical burden even if not legally – has been great.
Human rights due diligence reverses this. By proactively undertaking
the process in the policy making and legislative phase, ISOs can
properly engage with players and their chosen representatives together
with other relevant experts to ensure that any potential adverse human
rights impacts are prevented, minimised, mitigated and accounted for.
WADA’s approach in 2013 and 2014 to addressing the human
rights impacts on players of the proposed revision of the WADA Code
to take effect in 2015 did not involve this fundamental reversal.
WADA engaged Jean-Paul Costa to write a legal opinion to confirm
the compatibility of several provisions of the draft revision of the
WADA Code with the accepted principles of international law and

234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. at 22-23.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
See supra notes 77 to 108.
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human rights.238 Mr. Costa, who served as a judge in the European
Court of Human Rights for thirteen years,239 did not refer to the UNGPs
in his opinion nor the responsibilities of States to protect human rights
and business to respect them.240 The opinion did not include any human
rights risk assessment or due diligence, nor did it refer to the
importance of “meaningful consultation with potentially affected
groups” in accordance with the UNGPs.241 The opinion did note,
however, that the United Nations Human Rights Committee, which
monitors the implementation of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, has a “universal mandate but is a quasijurisdiction without the authority to enforce its decisions.”242
The Official Basketball Rules 2014 as promulgated by FIBA
provide a straightforward example of the benefits that would flow from
ISOs proactively incorporating human rights due diligence into their
decision-making processes.243 Rule 4.4.2 has long provided that
“[p]layers shall not wear equipment (objects) that may cause injury to
other players. The following are not permitted . . . Headgear, hair
accessories and jewellery.”244
This rule, ostensibly created to promote player safety, has the
impact of discriminating against, for example, Muslim women whose
faith requires them to play in a headscarf.245 The impact of the rule has
been to deny a player such as Bilqis Abdul-Qaadir the right to play
basketball and pursue it as a profession.246 Through the application of
the UNGPs, FIBA is obliged to remove that impact and ensure that the
Rule’s stated purpose of player safety is advanced in a way that
furthers the growth and development of the sport and is consistent with

238. WADA, Legal opinion on the 2015 Code (June 2013), https://www.wadaama.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/WADC-Legal-Opinion-on-Draft-2015-Code-3.0EN.pdf.
239. Id.
240. See supra notes 9 to 10, Part I.
241. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 9, at 19.
242. Legal opinion on the 2015 Code, supra note 238; International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, supra, note 32.
243. See generally Official Basketball Rules 2014, FIBA CENT. BOARD (Oct. 1, 2014),
https://www.fiba.com/downloads/rules/2014/official_basketball_rules_2014_y.pdf.
244. Id. at 12 (emphasis in original).
245. See Stephanie Kline, FIBA’s ‘hijab ban’ still the rule in women’s basketball, LIMA
CHARLIE NEWS (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.limacharlienews.com/op-ed/fiba-hijab-banwomens-basketball/.
246. See Danny Davis, For Muslim woman, ban on hijab ended basketball career, MY
STATESMAN (Mar. 11, 2017, 6:37 PM), http://www.mystatesman.com/sports/for-muslimwoman-ban-hijab-ended-basketball-career/5s4qW6xE5z03ielj7EKYYI/.
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the human rights of players.
In 2014, football addressed an identical situation following a twoyear trial period.247 FIFPro worked in conjunction with FIFA and
representatives of the game and players in Western Asia to amend the
Laws of the Game so that players could play in a headscarf.248 Apparel
and equipment manufacturers were extensively involved in that
process to ensure that all player health and safety concerns were
addressed.249 The wearing of headscarves by Muslim players is now
common place and in 2016, Jordan hosted the FIFA Under 17
Women’s World Cup.250
The human rights due diligence process mandated by the UNGPs
would have identified the discriminatory impact of FIBA’s Rule 4.2.2
in relation to Muslim women, allowing FIBA to mitigate the impact of
the Rule by permitting headgear that is safe. For instance, the Laws of
the Game of football now provide that “[n]on-dangerous protective
equipment, for example headgear, facemasks and knee and arm
protectors made of soft, lightweight padded material is permitted…”251
(3)Access to an Effective Remedy
The third key commitment of ISOs in order to meet their
responsibility to respect human rights is to have in place “[p]rocesses
to enable the remediation of any adverse human rights impacts they
247. See FIFA lifts ban on head covers, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 1, 2014),
http://www.aljazeera.com/sport/football/2014/03/fifa-allows-hijab-turban-players20143113053667394.html.
248. See Laws of the Game 2016/2017, THE INT’L FOOTBALL ASS’N BOARD, at 42 (June 1,
2016),
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/footballdevelopment/refereeing/02/79/92/44/laws.of.the.
game.2016.2017_neutral.pdf; see also Jordanian legacy bodes well for future of women’s
football,
FIFA.COM
(Oct.
24,
2016),
http://www.fifa.com/u17womensworldcup/news/y=2016/m=10/news=jordanian-legacybodes-well-for-future-of-women-s-football-2845723.html; see also Fifa allows wearing of
head
covers
for
religious
reasons,
BBC
SPORT
(Mar.
1,
2014),
http://www.bbc.com/sport/football/26398297.
249. See Scott Rafferty, Nike Developing ‘Pro Hijab’ for Muslim Athletes, ROLLING
STONE (Mar. 8, 2017), http://www.rollingstone.com/sports/nikes-pro-hijab-being-developedfor-muslim-athletes-w470970.
250. See Shireen Ahmed, Inclusion, excitement and a series of firsts in Jordan at U17
Women’s
World
Cup,
EXCELLE
SPORTS
(Sept.
30,
2016),
http://www.excellesports.com/news/inclusion-excitement-series-firsts-jordan-u17-womensworld-cup/; see also Jordanian legacy bodes well for future of women’s football, FIFA.COM
(Oct.
24,
2016),
http://www.fifa.com/u17womensworldcup/news/y=2016/m=10/news=jordanian-legacybodes-well-for-future-of-women-s-football-2845723.html.
251. See Laws of the Game 2016/2017, supra note 248, at 42.
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cause or to which they contribute.”252 Where ISOs “have caused or
contributed to adverse impacts, they should provide for or cooperate in
their remediation through legitimate processes.”253 This third
commitment acknowledges that, even “with the best policies and
practices, a business enterprise may cause or contribute to adverse
human rights impacts that it has not foreseen or been able to
prevent.”254
As this paper has considered at Part II(C), ISOs including the
IOC, FIFA and WADA operate a sophisticated arbitration system
through the ICAS and the CAS. However, as Professor Ruggie noted
in his report to FIFA, “[i]f an arbitration system is going to deal
effectively with human rights-related complaints, it needs certain
procedural and substantive protections to be able to deliver on that
promise” and for such an arbitration system to deal effectively with
human rights-related complaints.255 Specifically, Recommendation 6.2
of Professor Ruggie’s report reads:
FIFA should review its existing dispute resolution
system for football-related issues to ensure that it does
not lead in practice to a lack of access to effective
remedy for human rights harms.
FIFA should ensure that its own dispute resolution
bodies have adequate human rights expertise and
procedures to address human rights claims, and urge
member associations, Confederations and the Court of
Arbitration for Sport to do the same;
The review should involve independent experts as well
as representatives of players and other users of the
system.256
Principle 31 of the UNGPs sets out some criteria to measure the
effectiveness of non-judicial grievance mechanisms.257 A mechanism
“can only serve its purpose if the people it is intended to serve know
about it, trust it and are able to use it…(W)here outcomes have
implications for human rights, care should be taken to ensure they are

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 9, at 15–16.
Id. at 24.
Id.
For the Game. For the World, supra note 28, at 26.
Id. at 35.
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 9, at 33-35.

4_FINAL_SCHWAB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

56

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

11/14/17 7:54 PM

[Vol. 32:4

in line with internationally recognized human rights.”258 Accordingly,
grievance mechanisms should be: legitimate; accessible; predictable;
equitable; transparent; rights-compatible; a source of continuous
learning; and based on engagement and dialogue.259
The international standard for the conduct and international
recognition of arbitral awards is the 1958 United Nations Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.260
Among many procedural safeguards, it requires the composition of the
arbitral panel to be “in accordance with the agreement of the parties.”261
This is a challenge to sport’s global governance framework which
gives sporting interests, including those of the IOC and ISOs,
substantial perceived control and influence over sports arbitration,
including the CAS. The ICAS is presently dominated by
representatives of ISOs, with the only athlete representatives being
appointed by the IOC Athletes Commission.262 The structure of the
ICAS highlights the burning questions over the legitimacy of lex
sportiva.263 Similarly, the UNGPs make it clear that: “Since a business
enterprise cannot, with legitimacy, both be the subjects of complaints
and unilaterally determine their outcome, these mechanisms should
focus on reaching agreed solutions through dialogue. Where
adjudication is needed, this should be provided by a legitimate,
independent third-party mechanism.”264
The UNGPs therefore recommend “collaborative initiatives” to
ensure:
…the availability of effective mechanisms through
which affected parties or their legitimate
representatives can raise concerns when they believe
the (human rights) commitments in question have not
been met. The legitimacy of such measures may be put
at risk if they do not provide for such
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
U.N. (2015), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/New-YorkConvention-E.pdf.
261. Id. at 10.
262. See generally Members, CT. OF ARB. FOR SPORT, http://www.tascas.org/en/icas/members.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2017); Code of Sports-related Arbitration,
C T.
OF
ARB.
FOR
SPORT
(Jan.
1,
2017),
http://www.tascas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Code_2017_FINAL__en_.pdf.
263. See Code of Sports-related Arbitration, Id..
264. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 9, at 35.
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mechanisms…These mechanisms should provide for
accountability and help enable the remediation of
adverse human rights impacts.265
In May 2017, FIBA announced that Rule 4.2.2 of the Official
Basketball Rules 2014 was to be amended with effect from 1 October
2017 to allow the wearing of hijabs. FIBA’s announcement read:
FIBA initiated a revision process of its headgear rule
in September 2014, with exceptions being granted at
national level as part of a two-year testing period.
This past January, the (FIBA) Central Board received
a report and, upon reviewing it, approved for the rule
to be modified. It issued a mandate to its Technical
Commission to come up with a proposal and this was
approved by the Central Board on Wednesday (3 May
2017).266
The presence within FIBA of an effective grievance mechanism
would have ensured that Muslim basketball player Bilqis AbdulQaadir could have pursued her rights to access and play basketball
without losing three years of her career due to having been
discriminated because of her gender and religion. Her inability to do
so demonstrates the importance of FIBA ensuring that affected
players can access an effective remedy in a timely manner.
VI. CONCLUSION
The continued revelations of wide-spread and systemic
corruption, cheating, and human rights abuse in world sport have
rightly created a crisis of confidence in the governance of ISOs. This
paper highlights how ISOs are also failing to protect, respect, and fulfil
the fundamental human rights of the players whose careers and
livelihoods depend on sport’s legal framework and system of justice.
The precarious position of the player at law and at work has been
exacerbated by the development of a special sports law – lex sportiva
– which lacks legitimacy. Imposed through dominant, albeit
questionable governance structures, the law’s lack of legitimacy is
rooted in four main features: (1) the acknowledged failures and
conflicts of interest within the governance of ISOs;267 (2) the lack of
265. Id. at 33.
266. FIBA, FIBA’s Mid-Term Congress unanimously ratifies new headgear rule, (May 4,
2017), http://www.fiba.com/news/fibas-mid-term-congress-ratifies-new-headgear-rule
267. See supra IV(A).
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involvement of the people bound by the law in the making of it – the
players;268 (3) the ongoing violation of the rights of players (especially
vulnerable players who are, naturally, the ones most in need of the
protection of the law);269 and (4) the law’s lack of recognition and
compliance with internationally recognised human rights.270 While
outside the scope of this paper, there are also grounds to suggest a fifth
– lex sportiva’s ineffectiveness in dealing with the sporting objectives
that theoretically underpin it. 271
The challenge and opportunity for all ISOs, including the IOC and
FIFA, is to uphold their constitutional commitments to human rights
and legitimize lex sportiva by embedding the fundamental human
rights of the players. The UNGPs provide the framework for sport to
do so in a manner which is now consistent with key policy decisions
made in 2016 and 2017. Whilst considerable substantive and
procedural reform and negotiation would be required, the realistic
outcome is a global sports law that complies with internationally
recognised human rights and which is enforceable through a properly
designed and agreed grievance mechanism, thereby ensuring access to
an effective remedy for those who have not had their human rights
respected and upheld.
The lack of legitimacy of lex sportiva and its adverse human
rights impacts on players are both known to the ISOs. It is time for
them to use that knowledge to do better.
The development of lex sportiva in this way would present the
third great development in the law as it applies to players since the
early 1960s. It would not only legitimize lex sportiva, it would play a
vital role in restoring confidence in the governance of ISOs. Sport
would be a force for good by setting a global benchmark for the respect
and fulfilment of human rights by business.

268.
269.
270.
271.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 196.
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APPENDIX –THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF PLAYER
RIGHTS
PREAMBLE
CONSIDERING THAT:
I. The organised players of the world have a proud history of
championing the dignity of the player and the humanity of sport. That
history demonstrates that where the fundamental human rights of the
player have been protected, respected and guaranteed, sport has grown
as both a social institution and as an economic activity and business.
II. In adopting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
1948, the peoples of the United Nations “reaffirmed their faith in
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined
to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger
freedom.”i
III. A universal commitment by the whole of sport is now
essential for sport to maintain its meaningful place in world culture,
retain its social licence, make social progress and achieve better
standards of life for everyone involved with or touched by it.
IV. Sport is controlled by international sporting federations,
national sporting organisations, professional sports leagues,
employers, business and governments. Players are the public face of
sport, and athletic performance is fundamental to the prestige,
popularity and viability of sport.
V. The mega scale, politicisation and commercialisation of sport
today sees a widespread failure to uphold the humanity of sport and
the dignity of the player.ii This also sees the violation by sport of
internationally recognised human rights – which are, at a minimum,
those expressed in The International Bill of Human Rights, the
International Labour Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work and Its Follow-Up and the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.iii
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CONSEQUENTLY:
VI. Every sport must:
A. work in partnership with the players to develop a strategic
vision for their sport;iv
B. respect, protect and guarantee the fundamental human rights
of everyone involved with or affected by sport including the
player;v
C. avoid infringing on the human rights of others and eliminate
all adverse human rights impacts with which they are
involved;vi
D. embrace and promote the responsibility of their sport to
respect human rights;vii
E. recognise that the player is, first, a human person and, then,
an athlete;viii
F. acknowledge the acute impact any failure to respect the
fundamental human rights of the player given the highly
skilled and inherently short-term nature of the athletic career;
G. acknowledge that any reliance on or application of the
“autonomy” or “specificity” of sport or any restraint or
limitation imposed on a player in the exercise of his or her
profession does not override the fundamental human rights of
the player and can only be given legal effect if necessary and
through collective bargaining and social dialogue;ix and
H. ensure that the internationally recognised human rights of the
player including as contained in this Universal Declaration of
Player Rights are legally adopted within the constituent
documents of their sport or pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement.x
NOW, THEREFORE, THE ORGANISED PLAYERS OF THE
WORLD DECLARE THAT:
Article 1. Protect, respect, remedy.
Every player has the right to a sporting environment that is well
governed, free of corruption, manipulation and cheating and protects,
respects and guarantees the fundamental human rights of everyone
involved in or affected by sport, including the player.xi
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Article 2. Access to sport.
Every player has the right to access and pursue sportxii as a career
and professionxiii based solely on merit.xiv
Article 3. Equality of opportunity.
(1) Every player is entitled to equality of opportunity in the
pursuit of sport without distinction of any kind and free of
discrimination, harassment and violence.xv
(2) A player’s right to pursue sport cannot be limited because of
his or her race, colour, birth, age, language, sexual orientation, gender,
pregnancy, religion, political or other opinion, responsibilities as a
carer, property or other status.xvi
Article 4. Rights of the child.
Every player who is a minor is entitled to the opportunity to freely
pursue sport in an inclusive, adapted and safe manner, and to have his
or her rights as a child protected, respected and guaranteed.xvii
Article 5. Right to work.
Every player has the right to work and the free choice of
employment as an athlete,xviii and to move freely in pursuit of that work
and employment.xix
Article 6. Right to organise and collectively bargain.
(1) Every player has the right to organise and collectively
bargain.xx
(2) Every player has the right to form and join player and athlete
associations and unions for the protection of his or her interests.xxi
Article 7. Right to share in economic activity and wealth.
Every player has the right to share fairly in the economic activity
and wealth of his or her sport which players have helped generate.xxii
Article 8. Fair and just working conditions.
(1) Every player has the right to just and favourable remuneration
and conditions of work, including a minimum wage, fair hours of
work, rest, leisure, the protection of wages, the certainty of a secure
contract and the protection of his or her status as a worker within the
employment relationship.xxiii
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(2) Every player, without any discrimination, has the right to
equal pay for equal work.xxiv
(3) A player has the right to negotiate the terms and conditions
upon which he or she is involved in sport and to be represented by
persons and organisations of his or her choosing in those
negotiations.xxv
(4) A player must only be bound by terms and conditions which
are legitimately made and administered through collective bargaining
or to which he or she has freely and genuinely consented.xxvi
Article 9. Promotion of physical health, mental health and
social wellbeing.
(1) Every player must be provided with a safe and secure
workplace and sporting environment, which promotes the player’s
safety, physical and mental health and his or her social wellbeing.xxvii
(2) A player must be treated and supported with utmost integrity
by healthcare professionals when injured or ill, and have direction and
control over that treatment and support.xxviii
(3) A player’s workplace and sporting environment must be
protected from both internal and external risks to his or her safety,
health and wellbeing. A player is entitled to decide on the measures
necessary to ensure the safety and security of the workplace and
sporting environment and to take any action reasonably necessary to
avoid those risks or prevent them from materialising.xxix
Article 10. Right to education.
To achieve fully his or her human potential and personality, every
player has the right to an education and the pursuit of work and life
beyond sport supplemented by the resources of the sport.xxx
Article 11. Right to privacy and the protection of personal data.
Every player has the right to a private life, privacy and protection
in relation to the collection, storage and transfer of personal data.xxxi
Article 12. Protection of name, image and performance.
Every player is entitled to have his or her name, image and
performance protected. A player’s name, image and performance may
only be commercially utilised with his or her consent, voluntarily
given.xxxii
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Article 13. Freedom of opinion and expression.
Every player has the right to freedom of opinion and
expression.xxxiii
Article 14. Protection of and equality before the law.
Every player has the right to the protection of the law and equality
before it.xxxiv
Article 15. Right to due process.
Every player is entitled to due process including, where charged,
to the presumption of innocence. Any penalty must be lawful,
proportionate and just.xxxv
Article 16. Right to an effective remedy.
Every player is entitled to have any dispute resolved through an
impartial and expeditious grievance mechanism in which the player
has an equal say in the appointment of the grievance panel, arbitrator
or other decision-making person or body. His or her sport must ensure
he or she is provided with access to an effective remedy where his or
her rights under this Declaration have not been protected or
respected.xxxvi
Article 17. Duty to respect the rights of others.
Every player has a duty to respect the rights of his or her fellow
players under this Declaration, and to respect the fundamental human
rights of everyone involved with or affected by sport.xxxvii
THIS DECLARATION IS ADOPTED BY THE EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE OF THE WORLD PLAYERS ASSOCIATION
MEETING IN PARIS, FRANCE ON THE 7TH DAY OF APRIL 2017.
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